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ABSTRACT
Cognitive ability is perhaps the most studied individual difference available to
researchers, being measured quickly and effectively while demonstrating a predictable
influence on many life outcomes. Historically, the evolution o f the psychometric study of
cognitive abilities has pivoted on the development o f new and better methodologies
allowing for a more complete and efficient capture o f intellect. For instance, recent
advances in computer and Internet technology have largely replaced traditional
pencil-and-paper methods, allowing for innovative item development and presentation.
However, concerns regarding the potential adverse impact and test security o f online
measures o f cognitive ability, particularly in unproctored situations, are well documented
and have limited the use o f such measures in organizational settings. Methods, such as
the use o f multiple test forms and computer adaptive testing coupled with item exposure
algorithms, have addressed some test-security concerns. However, these methods require
the costly and tedious development o f extensive item pools. The burgeoning area o f
automatic item generation potentially addresses many o f the test-security and
item-development concerns through the creation o f assessment items based solely on an
item model and a computer algorithm. Moreover, once the elements that contribute to
item difficulty are calibrated, the psychometric properties o f the items are known,
meaning that little to no human review o f the items is required before their use. The
purpose o f the current study was to develop an experimental non-verbal measure of

cognitive ability through automatic item generation, using an innovative item type. Using
a sample o f 333 adults, the results o f the current analysis support the proposed cognitive
model’s ability to explain item difficulty. Likewise, the temporal stability and predictive
validity o f the experimental measure are supported. In doing so, the experimental
measure answers some o f the test-security and item-generation concerns that are
associated with the development and administration o f cognitive-ability measures in
organizational settings.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The measurement o f cognitive ability has been heralded as one o f the crowning
achievements of the psychological sciences (Lamb, 1994). For an investment o f an hour
or less, psychologists can gain insights into an individual’s functioning that may not be
uncovered through long and costly observations (Nettlebeck & Wilson, 2005). It is the
easiest, most reliable, and most valid individual difference available to psychologists and
researchers, measured cheaply and quickly (Cohen & Swerdlik, 2009; Fumham, 2008;
Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Moreover, the scores obtained from broad measures of
cognitive ability (e.g., I.Q.) conform to the terms commonly used in society to describe
individuals as intelligent or smart (Hermstein & Murray, 1994). As such, the terms
cognitive ability and general mental ability (GMA) are often used synonymously with
intelligence (Gottfredson, 2002).
However, change is a defining feature o f the cognitive-abilities research.
Throughout the history o f psychometric investigations o f cognitive abilities, researchers
have embraced methodological advances leading to better and more efficient methods o f
understanding the nature o f intellect. For instance, the development o f sophisticated
statistical procedures such as exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis allowed
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cognitive theorists to peer beyond the data and develop models that explain the nature o f
intellectual ability (Carroll, 1993; Cattell, 1971; Guilford, 1988; McGrew, 1997;
Spearman, 1904; Thurstone, 1938). These advanced statistical procedures have also aided
in the nullification or outright dismissal o f competing theories o f intelligence that fail to
produce consistent or logical evidence concerning their validity (Carroll, 2003; Keith &
Reynolds, 2010). Thus, methodological advances have aided cognitive abilities
researchers in the pursuit o f greater clarity with regard to what it means to be clever.
Change is also a constant in the measurement o f cognitive abilities. For instance,
early investigations o f intellectual functioning focused primarily on measures o f sensory
ability as proxy measures o f intellectual ability (Hergenhahn, 2009). However, once it
was demonstrated that sensory abilities failed to explain real-world performance (e.g.,
academic achievement), attention was turned to the measurement of higher level mental
processes and their practical benefits in differentiating the performance o f individuals.
Likewise, the circumstances o f World War I dictated a paradigm shift in assessment
administration. The result o f this shift was the advent o f group testing, allowing for the
quick and efficient collection of vast amounts o f information on a large number o f
individuals for whom personnel decisions could be made (Boake, 2002). As such,
cognitive-abilities research and measurement can be seen as an evolving field marked by
innovation resulting in more accurate and efficient measures o f intellectual ability
(Drasgow & Olson-Buchanan, 1999; Gierl & Haladyna, 2012; Parshall & Harmes, 2009).
Throughout much o f the 20th century, paper-and-pencil-based measures of
cognitive abilities were the dominant medium by which intelligence was tested. As it has
in almost all other areas o f society, the technological revolution has transformed our daily
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lives. Computers are now small, fast, and cheap, allowing much o f society to embrace
their use (Chernyshenko & Stark, 2015). However, advances in computer and Internet
technology have opened a new universe o f methodological considerations from which
cognitive ability can be tapped (Naglieri et al., 2004). While early versions o f
computer-based assessments were little more than direct translations o f paper-and-pencil
measures to a computerized medium, the measurement o f cognitive ability is no longer
restricted to static statements and images (Barak & English, 2002; Bartram, 2006).
Rather, a diverse array o f innovative and dynamic auditory and visual items can be
administered via computer, potentially tapping cognitive ability in ways that were
previously impossible to achieve (Parshall & Harmes, 2009). Moreover, computerized
assessments realize practical benefits such as standardized item administration and
automatic scoring, thus reducing error and improving test reliability. Likewise,
administering computerized assessments online allows for an immense pool o f test takers
to sit for the same measure from anywhere in the world and at a time o f their choosing,
reducing the costs associated with testing programs (Drasgow & Olson-Buchanan, 1999;
Naglieri et al., 2004). Thus, many test developers have embraced the technological
revolution as more and more tests are being developed that can exploit the advantages
afforded by computers and the Internet.
Despite the practical and measurement advantages offered by computer and
online administration, problems in the areas o f test construction and administration
persist. For instance, large item pools are generally required as part o f the
test-development process. This problem is compounded when multiple forms o f the same
measure or advanced item-presentation methods (e.g., computer-adaptive testing) are
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used, necessitating an even larger number o f items (Drasgow, Nye, Guo, & Tay, 2009).
However, not all items that are created are useable. Despite the need for quality items and
despite care taken to generate items that tap the construct o f interest, many items must be
removed at the item-analysis phase due to insufficient psychometric characteristics
(Geerlings, Glas, & van der Linden, 2011; Wainer, 2002). This problem is particularly
relevant to human item writers who often fail to construct items that conform to the
construct o f interest or at a desirable level o f difficulty, further limiting the number o f
usable items (Homke & Habon, 1986). Moreover, some cognitive researchers have
questioned the validity o f the results obtained from measures o f intelligence administered
in unproctored environments (Naglieri et al., 2004). The administration o f measures in
uncontrolled environments introduces a host o f test-security threats (e.g., cheating) that
distort test taker scores in ways that are difficult to detect. Since these distortions are not
systematic, the validity o f a measure is often greatly reduced due to the lessened
predictive power it possesses (Foster, 2010). Thus, although technological advances have
afforded greater options in how and where tests are administered, persistent issues remain
that stunt researchers’ ability to obtain convenient and accurate results.
The burgeoning arena o f automatic item generation (AIG) seeks to address the
concerns raised through the generation o f a vast number o f unique items strictly through
an algorithm (Gierl, Ball, Vele, & Lai, 2015). Using an item model, the structural
elements that relate to item difficulty are identified and manipulated, producing an array
o f items with known psychometric characteristics. Thus, little or no human review o f the
items is required before their administration (Doebler & Holling, 2015). Moreover, recent
advances in AIG methodology allow for the creation o f items directly from the calibrated
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structural elements, thereby addressing several issues associated with traditional test
construction and administration (Geerlings, van der Linden, & Glas, 2012).
Despite the advantages posed through its use, limited research exists concerning
the construction and subsequent validation o f cognitive ability measures developed using
AIG methodology (Gierl & Lai, 2012). Many researchers studying AIG measures have
only examined the construct validation o f the items, ignoring the predictive validity o f
these measures. Furthermore, the capability to create dynamically generated and
presented items on-the-fly though AIG methodology has received little attention
(Geerlings et al., 2012).
The purpose o f the current research is to build on the existing AIG
methodological framework through the construction and validation o f an on-the-fly
measure o f cognitive ability that is generated at the time o f item presentation. As such,
this measure will not draw from a preexisting pool o f items. Rather, the current measure
will create items dynamically through predefined computer algorithms. The benefits o f
such a measure will address many o f the issues that surround current test development.
First, such a measure will be capable o f generating a vast number o f items through the
use o f an algorithm applied to an item model, producing items with known psychometric
characteristics. As such, once calibrated, thousands o f unique items o f varying difficulty
can be generated, without the need o f human intervention. Second, many issues o f test
security will be addressed as each test taker will be administered different items.
Although different items will comprise the measure for each test taker, the items will be
calibrated such that the measure has identical construct adherence and psychometric
properties. Third, once created, the criterion related validity o f the measure will be
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assessed by examining the relationship that the experimental AIG measure shares with
established indicators of cognitive ability. Thus, the experimental AIG measure created
through this research is expected to advance the field’s understanding o f AIG item
development and its relationship to other measures o f cognitive ability.
Cognitive Ability
Although cognitive ability is one o f the most studied individual differences in all
of psychology (Gottfredson, 2002), reaching definitional agreement has proven
problematic. In general terms, cognitive ability can be conceptualized as the basic mental
capacity to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, understand sophisticated and
complex ideas, and acquire new information quickly and efficiently (Gottfredson, 2004).
Similarly, Neisser (1967) defines intelligence as the “ability to understand complex ideas,
to adapt effectively to the environment, to learn from experience and to engage in various
forms o f reasoning to overcome obstacles by taking thought” (p.7). Despite these
seemingly straightforward descriptions o f intelligence, substantial disagreement remains
among cognitive ability theorists regarding the number o f facets that are considered
essential and how they should be arranged (Carroll, 1993; Cattell, 1971; Guilford, 1988;
McGrew, 1997; Spearman, 1904; Sternberg, 1999). As quipped by Ackerman, Beier, and
Boyle (2005), “there are as many intelligence theories as there are intelligence
theorists...” (p. 31).
From a practical standpoint, people are readily able to recognize intelligence in
others. Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, and Bernstein (1981) attempted to uncover this
implicit conceptualization o f intelligence by asking laypersons going about their daily
lives in places such as grocery store parking lots to describe the behaviors associated with

various portrayals o f intelligence. The researchers then asked cognitive ability experts
(i.e., psychologists) the same question. After analyzing the statements produced, the
researchers found that although the two groups differed in their academic familiarity with
the construct, both groups produced a pattern o f relatively consistent descriptive terms o f
intellectual ability. For example, the attributes most associated with prototypical
intellectual ability included problem solving, reasoning, and open-mindedness.
Conversely, the hallmarks o f unintelligence are characterized by personality trait-like
behaviors (Costa & McCrae, 1992) including a lack o f curiosity and a lack o f tolerance
o f the views held by others. However, despite the consistency o f responses obtained by
the researchers, the variety o f the descriptors o f prototypical intellectual ability is
indicative o f the difficulty cognitive theorists have had in reaching definitional
agreement.
Factor Analytic Theories
Although obtaining definitive agreement on a definition o f intelligence has been
elusive (Sternberg & Detterman, 1986), the emergence o f several theories o f intelligence
can be traced to an important development in the field o f statistics. In the early 1900s,
Charles Spearman (1904) developed a primitive form o f modem factor analysis allowing
researchers to clarify the latent relationships shared by specific variables or phenomena.
The purpose o f factor analysis is to reduce and represent the number o f observed
variables into a smaller number o f underlying hypothetical variables or "factors"
(Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). The interpretation and measurement o f each factor is
dependent on a determination o f the observed variables that make up the factor. Thus, by
examining the interrelationships shown from factor analyzing measures o f intellect,

theorists are able to construct models o f cognitive abilities that account for the results
obtained.
Importantly, the latent structure o f the factors that emerges from factor analysis is
often open to interpretation. The choices made in conducting factor analysis (e.g.,
rotations, eigenvalue and factor loading cutoffs) complicate the convergence of
interpretations that are made (DeVellis, 2012). Moreover, the labels that are applied to
the factor(s) that emerge are dependent on the researcher’s ability to subjectively
determine the content and associated psychological processes o f the measures that load
most heavily on a particular factor. Thus, the interpretation o f factors can be viewed as an
art grounded in empirical data.
As stated by Humphreys (1962), “test behavior can almost endlessly be made
more specific...factors can almost endlessly be fractionated or splintered” (p. 475). Thus,
competing theories o f intelligence have emerged stipulating a variety o f structures and a
diverse set o f factors that make up cognitive functioning. However, as pointed out by
Vernon (1950), only the factors that are “shown to have significant practical value in
daily life are worth incorporating in the picture” (p. 25).
Two-Factor Theory. Perhaps the most famous and influential o f the cognitive
theorists is Charles Spearman. Noting that students who performed well on one measure
o f intelligence tended to perform well on other cognitive measures, Spearman (1904)
used his factor analytic technique to identify the commonalities across performance
across measures. Based on his findings, Spearman developed his theory o f general
intelligence, tapped by all measures o f cognitive ability. Known as the Two-Factor theory
o f Intelligence, Spearman found that two factors or forms o f intelligence emerged from
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the data: a general factor (g) and a test specific (5 ) factor. According to Spearman (1927),
g is an innate general mental ability that contributes to all cognitive processes. This g
factor is a "general fund o f mental energy” (Spearman, 1914, p. 103) that explains why
an individual’s score on any given measure o f cognitive ability is correlated with the
scores obtained from other measures o f cognitive ability. Conversely, .v-factors explain
why someone may obtain higher or lower scores on any given intellectual measure, but
not performance across measures or task-domains. That is, specific factors, along with
error, explain why performance on different cognitive measures is less than perfectly
correlated. As such, 5-factors do not add to the prediction o f additional variance in
cognitive ability because they operate only within specific measures o f intelligence
(Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). Thus, g and
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are differentiated in that g is responsible for an

individual’s performance across all measures o f cognitive ability, while 5-factors are
restricted to performance on independent measures of mental abilities. As such, g is
thought to explain intellectual test performance (Jensen, 1998), conforming to what
people describe as intelligence and leading most psychologists to adopt it as their
operational definition o f intelligence (Gottfredson, 2002). Thus, the importance o f g to
intellectual ability cannot be overstated as indicated by Ree and Earles (1993), “g is to
psychology what carbon is to chemistry” (p.l 1).
Evidence o f Spearman’s theory is provided by the positive correlation observed
across measures o f cognitive ability. The g factor emerges regardless o f whether mental
test batteries are administered to different ages, sexes, races, and national groups and
subsequently factor analyzed (Jensen, 1998). As such, although mental tests are designed
to measure specific areas o f cognitive functioning (e.g., verbal, spatial, and quantitative

ability), individuals who perform well in one area, also tend to perform well on the others
(Gardner, 1999), a phenomenon that Spearman termed "indifference o f the indicator"
(Spearman, 1927).
The core o f cognitive ability research rests on this positive manifold (van der
Maas, Kan, & Borsboom, 2014), the observation that the subtests o f all intelligence tests
ranging from academic measures to measures o f social intelligence are positively
correlated, g refers to a latent variable that results from the intercorrelation o f several
measures o f cognitive ability (Spearman, 1927). Tests that correlated well with other
measures o f intelligence are indicative o f higher levels o f g-saturation. As such,
g-saturation indicates the degree that a measure is tapping the general fund o f mental
energy. In contrast, cognitive tests that demonstrate a lesser relationship to other
measures are thought to tap s factors such as residual variance due to test-specific
abilities or otherwise contain error (e.g., unreliability). Therefore, higher levels o f
g-saturation are considered better predictors o f intelligence. As such, Spearman suggests
that a single highly g-saturated test be substituted for heterogeneous collections o f tasks
and items found in measures o f intelligence (Spearman, 1927).
In order to select a measure that best approximated g, Spearman (1927) described
g as the ability to extrapolate principles from one’s experience and observations, best
measured by abstract reasoning problems in formal tests. According to Spearman (1938),
the Penrose and Raven (1936), later named Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven &
Court, 1989) well represented the abilities associated with g. As such, the defining
characteristics o f tests that tap g are non-verbal assessments o f spatial or inductive
reasoning.
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Spearman noted that the Two-factor theory must be qualified, allowing for an
intermediate class of factors that fall between g and .s-factor. These intermediate factors,
termed group factors, relate to some but not all intellectual tasks. Group factors are
neither as universally broad as g, nor as specific as .v (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). Through
the continued research o f Spearman and his students, group factors such as mathematical,
mechanical, and linguistic abilities were uncovered, laying the groundwork for future
research and the development o f more complex models o f intellectual ability.
Primary Mental Abilities. On the heels o f Spearman’s work in identifying group
factors, theories of intelligence moved from the existence o f a single underlying mental
ability to the identification o f several abilities, and then to many. One such theory o f
multiple-intelligence was promoted by Louis Thurstone. Thurstone (1947) developed an
advanced factor analytic technique allowing for the discovery o f a multiple-factor
structure o f intelligence using orthogonal and oblique rotations, improving the
interpretability o f the data. Employing these techniques, Thurstone identified g as a
second order factor subsuming narrower mental abilities.
Thurston (1938) concluded that intelligence could best be explained by seven
primary mental abilities: Word Fluency, Verbal Comprehension, Number, Space,
Perceptual Speed, Associative Memory, and Induction. Thus, in contrast to Spearman,
Thurstone believed that cognitive ability was the result o f multiple factors o f cognitive
abilities rather than a single overarching factor.
Despite Thurstone’s assertion that intelligence was comprised o f seven
independent abilities, subsequent studies failed to replicate his findings. Rather, later
studies showed that the original factors that Thurston obtained were less orthogonal than
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originally believed (Thurstone & Thurstone, 1941). Thus, after noting the
intercorrelations obtained between mental ability measures specifically designed to assess
discrete facets o f cognitive ability, Thurston (1947) doubted the possibility that an
orthogonal structure o f intelligence could be developed that did not capture g, reconciling
his ideas with those o f Spearman.
Structure-of-Intellect. Despite Thurstone’s assertion, other theorists have denied
the existence of g. For instance, based on his own factor analytic research, Guilford
(1967, 1988) developed a model that eliminated the role o f g in explaining performance
on intelligence measures. Guilford's Structure-of-Intellect (S-I) is a box-like schema from
which intellectual traits are classified along three dimensions: Operations, Contents, and
Products. Operations represent the mental activities or processes that are performed by
the individual. Operations can be further classified as cognition, memory recording,
memory retention, divergent production, convergent production, and evaluation. Contents
represent the information or materials that receive the operations. Contents include
auditory, visual, semantic, symbolic, and behavioral information. Products represent the
various forms in which content may be processed. Products can be further classified as
units, classes, relations, systems, transformations, and implications.
Each factor o f cognitive ability in Guilford’s S-I model is derived from the
sub-classifications of the Operations, Contents, and Products dimensions. Since at least
one factor is expected from each cell in the schema, 180 (6 x 5 x 6 = 180) or more factors
constitute intellectual ability. As such, abilities represent a specific operation, in a
specific content area, leading to a specific output (e.g., Evaluation o f Semantic
Implications). Since Guilford considered the factors that were produced from the S-I
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model to be orthogonal, he rejected the value o f g and hierarchical relationships o f mental
abilities. Like Thurstone’s model, the S-I model was derived from an orthogonal rotation
of test scores (Guilford, 1967). However, unlike other factor analytic theories, the S-I
theory o f intelligence was derived from a theoretical basis and tests were then constructed
to measure the hypothesized components.
However, the S-l model failed to gain an influential foothold in cognitive ability
testing (Carroll, 1993). Likewise, re-analyses o f Guilford’s factor-analytic data indicate
that other models provide better fit to the data, including randomly generated models. As
such, Carroll (1993) described the considerable amount o f attention paid to the S-I model
as disturbing and as providing the impression that the model is a widely accepted and
valid theory o f cognitive ability, which it is not.
Gf-Gc. In contrast to the S-I theory, a model that is widely accepted is the Gf-Gc
theory forwarded by Cattell (1941). Based on the works o f Thurstone in the 1930s, the
original Gf-Gc theory suggests that intellectual ability is comprised o f two primary
abilities: Fluid and Crystalized Intelligences.
Fluid Intelligence (Gf) consists o f the focused attention to process information
and solve problems that cannot be performed automatically and/or are independent o f any
learned information (Schneider & McGrew, 2012). Since the abilities that are associated
with G f are biologically rooted, they are thought to be culture-free, non-verbal, and
independent of any form o f instruction allowing individuals to adapt to new situations
and learn from their environments (Cattell, 1957, 1971). Thus, individuals who possess
high levels o f G f are able to act quickly and encode short-term memories that enable
abstract problem solving. The mental operations associated with G f that promote problem
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solving include recognizing and transforming information and concepts, perceiving
relationships among patterns, drawing inferences or otherwise extrapolating answers, and
comprehending the implications o f the solution reached. Inductive and deductive
reasoning are the defining characteristics o f fluid intelligence best measured through
tasks including figural matrices, number series, analogical reasoning, and figural analyses
(Sattler, 2001).
Crystalized Intelligence (Gc) consists o f the acquired skills and knowledge that
are derived from one’s experience and valued by one’s culture (Schneider & McGrew,
2012). As described by Horn and Blankson (2005), the abilities associated with Gc are
verbally based, developed through an investment o f mental energies into educational and
other life experiences. The types o f knowledge that are subsumed by Gc include both
static declarative (e.g., factual information, comprehension, concepts, rules, and
relationships) and dynamic procedural (e.g., process o f reasoning based on previously
learned information). As such, Gc is not only a repository o f information, but is also a set
o f processing abilities wherein memory retrieval and the application o f general
knowledge are components.
Cattell-Horn. Through his own factor analytic research, Horn ( 1968, 1988, 1991)
expanded on Cattell's dichotomous Gf-Gc model, adding several additional factors: visual
perception or processing (Gv), speed o f processing (Gs), short-term memory (Gsm),
long-term memory (Glr), auditory processing ability (Ga). Later, Horn added factors
representing reaction time and decision speed (Gt), quantitative (Gq), and broad
reading-writing (Grw) abilities. This conglomerate eight-factor model became known as
the Cattell-Horn theory (Horn, 1991).
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Three-Stratum Theory. Carroll (1993) reported the exploratory factor analytic
results o f over 460 datasets, building on the research o f influential theorists such as
Cattell, Horn, Thurstone, and Thorndike. The magnitude and comprehensiveness o f this
analysis was not lost on other researchers. As indicated by Jensen (2004), "Carroll's
magnum opus thus distills and synthesizes the results o f a century o f factor analyses o f
mental tests. It is virtually the grand finale o f the era o f psychometric description and
taxonomy o f human cognitive abilities. It is unlikely that his monumental feat will ever
be attempted again by anyone, or that it could be much improved on" (p. 5).
Carroll's influential Three-Stratum theory o f intelligence differentiates factors and
abilities into three hierarchically arranged levels (Carroll, 1997). In geological terms, a
stratum is a bed o f sedimentary rock or soil that distinguishes itself from adjacent strata.
Similarly, Carroll proposed that intelligence is best modeled in hierarchical terms. The
top stratum, Stratum III, is g or general intellectual ability. As represented by Spearman
(1904), g is a broad processing ability that is behind all higher-order thinking and
subsumes the other two strata in the models. Known as broad or Stratum II abilities, the
second stratum is comprised o f eight abilities, incorporating Cattell's fluid (Gf) and
crystalized (Gc) intelligences, along with broad visual perception (Gv), broad auditory
perception (Ga), broad retrieval capacity (Gr), broad cognitive speediness (G.s),
processing/decision speed (Gt), and general memory and learning (Gy), each requiring
differing processes, tasks, and content. These abilities are the most recognized and
prominent abilities in Carroll’s model, representing "basic constitutional and long
standing characteristics o f individuals that can govern or influence a wide variety o f
behaviors in a given domain" (Carroll, 1993; p. 634). Below each Stratum II ability lays

the 69 Stratum I level factors or speed factors that are associated with a specific Stratum
II ability (Jensen, 1998). These narrow abilities "...represent greater specializations o f
abilities, often in quite specific ways that reflect the effects o f experience and learning, or
the adoption o f particular strategies o f performance” (Carroll, 1993, p. 634). Although
other theorist such as Burt (1949) and Vernon (1950) proposed hierarchical models o f
intellectual ability, Carroll’s model was the first “empirically based taxonomy of
cognitive ability... presented in a single organized framework” (McGrew, 2009, p. 2).
Importantly, the abilities in Carroll’s model exhibit positive relationships with one
another. As such, the mutual relationships shared between the narrow Stratum I abilities
gives rise to the broader Stratum II abilities. Likewise, the positive relationships that
associate Stratum II abilities allows for the approximation o f the g-factor at Stratum III.
Although these positive relationships indicate that the abilities are not completely
orthogonal to one another, a vast amount o f research indicates that the factors can be
consistently differentiated from one another, thus indicating that they are in fact unique
facets o f cognitive ability (Keith & Reynolds, 2010).
Cattell-Horn-Carroll. Carroll (1993) stated that the Cattell-Horn Gf-Gc model
"appears to offer the most well-founded and reasonable approach to an acceptable theory
o f the structure o f cognitive abilities” (p. 62). Perhaps due to his admiration o f the work
o f Cattell and Horn, the Carroll’s Three Stratum and the Cattell-Horn models are quite
similar. For example, both o f the proposed models contain broad abilities that subsume
narrower abilities. Likewise, both models share similar classifications o f these abilities.
However, the models are distinguished from one another. Several o f the differences
between the models involve the definitions attributed to specific abilities and the
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groupings of narrower facets. The biggest difference between the models is existence of
g. That is. Carroll’s model suggests that an overarching g-factor subsumes narrower
abilities, while the Cattell-Horn model does not include a g-factor.
Despite the differences embodied by the Cattell-Horn and Carroll models,
researchers recognized the need for a common framework to describe, organize, select,
and interpret assessments and assessment batteries. To meet this need, McGrew (1997)
proposed a hybrid model combining the Cattell-Horn and Carroll models in to what
became known as the Cattell-Hom-Carroll (CHC) theory, with the order o f the names
reflecting the chronological order in which the theorists made their contributions. As
such, CHC theory represents over 60 years o f factor analytic research o f cognitive ability.
The CHC model is arranged in three hierarchal levels. Like Carroll’s
Three-Stratum theory, at Stratum III, the top level, the general factor o f intelligence or g
resides. Stratum II contains the broad cognitive abilities while the narrow abilities lie at
the bottom level in Stratum I. In its original configuration, CHC theory contained 10
broad cognitive abilities and over 70 narrow abilities. However, CHC theory is not static.
Rather, CHC is continuously refined, reorganized, and restructured as additional research
is conducted (McGrew & Flanagan, 1998; Flanagan, 2000). As stated by Jensen (2004),
CHC is "an open-ended empirical theory to which future tests o f as yet unmeasured or
unknown abilities could possibly result in additional factors at one or more levels in
Carroll's hierarchy” (p. 5). Carroll (2005) reiterates this point noting that CHC most
assuredly contains errors that may be rectified through continued research. In its current
form, CHC theory consists o f 16 broad stratum abilities and over 80 narrow abilities
(Schneider & McGrew, 2012). The 16 broad stratum abilities o f CHC currently include

Fluid Intelligence (Gf), Crystalized Intelligence (Gc), General (Domain-Specific)
Knowledge (Gkn), Quantitative Knowledge (Gq), Reading/Writing Ability (Grw),
Short-Term Memory (Gsm), Long-Term Storage and Retrieval (Glr), Visual Processing
(Gv), Auditory Processing (Ga), Olfactory Abilities (Go), Tactile Abilities (Gh),
Psychomotor Abilities (Gp), Kinesthetic Abilities (Gk), Processing Speed (Gs), Decision
Speed/Reaction Time (Gt), and Psychomotor Speed (Gps). However, o f the Stratum II
abilities, G f and Gc are the most related to g (Carroll, 2003).
Although the CHC model was forwarded by McGrew (1997) to pragmatically
classify narrow cognitive ability measures that are contained in individually administered
intellectual assessments, this model is the most theoretically sound and empirically
supported model o f intelligence available (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; McGrew,
2009; Stankov, 2000). For instance, the factor structure o f CHC is supported by factor
analytic evidence that not only demonstrates the consistency o f the factors derived, but
the invariance o f the three-stratum factor structure across one’s life (Bickley, Keith, &
Wolfle, 1995) and across gender, ethnic, and cultural groups (Carroll, 1993). Likewise,
evidence provided from studies o f developmental, neurocognitive, and heritability lend
support to the CHC model (Horn & Blankson, 2005). As such, the CHC model is backed
by a more extensive array o f validation evidence than any other modem theory of
cognitive ability (Schneider & McGrew, 2012).
The core practice in scientific fields is the classification o f empirical observations
(Bailey, 1994). As argued by Miller (1996), useful taxonomies draw distinctions o f
conceptual importance, raise contrasts that enable empirical advancement, and possess
elements that form a coherent whole. Given the substantial amount o f evidence

19

supporting the structure o f the CHC model, the value o f such a model is the common
framework that allows practitioners to think alike regarding the measurement o f cognitive
abilities and the usefulness o f the broad vs. narrow facets. The CHC model is particularly
relevant to the area o f school psychology and psychoeducational assessment as several
measures o f cognitive abilities have incorporated CHC as a theoretical foundation. For
instance, CHC provides researchers a means to design and evaluate cognitive assessments
and a common language for describing research findings that stimulates the empirical
investigation o f the structure and nature o f cognitive abilities (Keith & Reynolds, 2010).
Theoretical Approaches to Intelligence
Despite the advances that have been made through the factor analysis o f test
scores, some researchers maintain that theories o f intelligence that are derived from such
exploratory analyses fail to capture the extent o f cognitive functioning. In contrast to
factor analytical accounts, a variety o f theoretical frameworks have been constructed that
purport to better conceptualize and measure intellectual ability.
Successful Intelligence. While Boring (1923) famously stated that intelligence is
what the tests test, Sternberg was dissuaded by conventional measures o f intelligence that
consisted solely o f measures o f analytical and memory items. Rather, Sternberg (2005)
proposed a competing information-processing model that has received considerable
attention. The Successful Intelligence theory, also known as Triarchic theory o f
intelligence (Sternberg, Grigorenko, Ferrari, & Clinkenbeard, 1999), suggests that
traditional measures of cognitive ability focus too much on analytical abilities, ignoring
creativity and practical thinking that allow an individual to deal effectively with the
world. Sternberg acknowledged that the measures o f analytical abilities and memory used
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in traditional measures o f cognitive ability are important indicators o f success in
academic environments. However, to achieve success “one needs not only to remember
and analyze concepts; also one needs to be able to generate and apply them” (Sternberg,
2005; p. 190). As Sternberg argued, there is a multitude o f ways for someone to be
successful at their job. That is, people achieve goals though selecting, shaping, and
adapting to their environment and contexts. What works for one person may not work for
another, but successful people modify their environments or circumstances to exploit
their skills and mitigate or eliminate their weaknesses. In contrast, the unsuccessful fail to
capitalize on their limited talents.
Since each path to success is different, Sternberg (2005) argued that what is meant
by intelligence will have a different meaning to each individual. Rather than an
overarching general intelligence or g, success is achieved through the combination and
utilization o f varied forms of thinking, namely Analytical, Creative, and Practical
intelligences. Analytical intelligence is used to analyze, judge, evaluate, compare, and
contrast relatively familiar, but abstract problems. Creative intelligence is used to cope
with relative novelty. Practical intelligence is used to select, shape, and adapt
environments to suit oneself. As suggested by Sternberg (2005), the strong relationship
noted between measures o f g and academic success is in part due to the failure of
traditional measures to assess creative and practical intelligence.
Core to Sternberg’s theory are the universal component processes that contribute
to the information processing required for analytical, creative, and practical thinking. A
component is defined as “an elementary information process that operates upon internal
representations o f objects or symbols” (Sternberg, 1977; p. 65). Components are thought
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to be universally applied across cultures, but their application will depend on the nature
of the problem faced (Sternberg, 2004). The theory o f successful intelligence proposes
that three component processes underlie human intellect: Metacomponents, Performance
components, and Knowledge-acquisition components. Metacomponents are the executive
processes that are responsible for the identification o f problems, strategizing a solution,
monitoring progress towards a goal, and evaluating the effectiveness o f the resultant
solution. Performance components set the plans of the metacomponents into action.
Knowledge-acquisition components are used to learn new declarative information and/or
how to solve problems.
Although Sternberg (2005) has supplied evidence to support the efficacy o f
Successful Intelligence theory, the procedures used in these studies have met with strong
criticisms, limiting the interpretability and veracity o f evidence provided. For example,
the measures o f the Sternberg Triarchic Abilities Test (STAT; Sternberg et al., 1999) are
inherently unreliable (Brody, 2003). When corrected for range and unreliability, the
correlations between the STAT and measures o f g are highly related. Thus, Successful
Intelligence appears to substantially related to g. Brody further demonstrates that
Sternberg’s three forms o f intelligence correlate at .62 or higher, indicating substantial
overlap between the supposedly independent factors. Likewise, the measures fail to
demonstrate convergent validity with other measures with which they should be
theoretically related. Gottfredson (2002) strongly criticized Sternberg’s assertions,
indicating that the authors “can support their...major theoretical propositions only by
ignoring the most relevant evidence on g and making implausible claims about practical
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intelligence'’ (p. 3). As such, the conclusions drawn by Sternberg that Successful
Intelligence theory is measuring attributes independent o f g are highly suspect.
Multiple Intelligences. However, Stenberg is not alone in the assertion that
intelligence is not well explained by g. Dismayed by the fact that traditional measures of
intelligence and academics in general focus predominantly on logical and linguistic
abilities, Gardner (2011) proposed his theory o f Multiple Intelligences (TMI). According
to Gardner’s TMI, intelligence is often defined too narrowly, including only those
capacities that are important for academic success. Rather, Gardner suggests that
intelligence is better represented by a spectrum o f abilities. In practice, people draw on
one or more o f these abilities at a time to produce outcomes or “end states.” For instance,
Gardner and Hatch (1989) argue that few occupations rely on a single form o f
intelligence. A surgeon, for example, must be able to not only solve problems as they
arise in an operating room, but also possess the manual dexterity to manipulate a scalpel
to correct the issue. As such, the surgeon is drawing on multiple forms o f intelligence to
influence success on-the-job.
In its current form, TMI consists o f nine distinct but closely related intelligences:
Verbal-Linguistic, Logical-Mathematical, Spatial-Visual, Body-Kinesthetic, Musical,
Naturalistic, Existential, Interpersonal, and Intrapersonal (Gardner, 2011). Since each
form o f intelligence is hypothesized to be independent o f all o f the others, a person can
be described by a unique intellectual profile o f the nine intelligences, highlighting one’s
intellectual strengths and weaknesses. Gardner advocates that academic environments
and curricula be tailored to suit the needs o f individual students and their pattern o f
intellectual abilities. Thus, schools will be equipped to identify and remediate a child’s
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weaker intelligence(s). However, since all intelligences are also interrelated, as one
becomes more proficient in a specific area, all areas o f intelligence are enhanced. As
such, Gardner believes that schools should be filled with a variety o f interesting toys,
books, games, and objects which can be manipulated and explored, thus providing
students with a multitude o f options to explore the world and enhance their intellectual
capacity. Many schools have adopted the principles o f TMI, producing a substantial
impact on the American educational system (Lubinski & Benbow, 1995).
Despite the acclaim and attention that Gardner’s TMI theory has obtained in
academic settings, critics remain unconvinced o f the merits o f TMI. From a theoretical
perspective, the fact that all o f the forms o f intelligence are supposedly interrelated and
performance in one area can promote growth in another supports the influence o f an
overall g factor. In fact, Gardner’s intelligences correlate well with standard measures o f
intelligence (e.g., the Wonderlic Personnel Test) and form a substantial g-factor (Visser,
Ashton, & Vernon, 2006). From a psychometric perspective, no empirical evidence has
been provided to demonstrate the claims made by Gardner, nor has the theory been
specified in enough detail to be effectively evaluated (Hunt, 2001). In Lubinski &
Benbow’s (1995) critical review o f TMI, the authors note that Gardner has gone to great
lengths to describe the various forms o f intelligence reinforcing the face validity o f the
theory. However, Gardner has failed to demonstrate that these intelligences are related to
real world outcomes. Likewise, Gardner has failed to provide reliability estimates for any
o f his scales. Thus, any inferences that can be drawn from his measures’ relationship to
outcomes are suspect at best. As such, until meaningful evidence supporting the
reliability and validity o f TMI is available, it poses limited utility.

Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, and Successive. Derived from Luria’s
(1966) organization of brain functioning, the Planning, Attention, Simultaneous, and
Successive (PASS) cognitive processing theory o f intelligence (Naglieri & Das, 1997;
Naglieri, Das, & Goldstein, 2014) focuses on how information is processed rather than
the kinds o f information that are processed. The PASS theory represents the integration
o f cognitive and neuropsychological research, positing four interrelated, yet distinct
neurocognitive abilities associated with various regions o f the brain. Planning is the
ability to control and direct one’s thoughts and actions to obtain an efficient solution to a
problem. Attention is the ability to direct one’s mental energy toward a target stimulus
while inhibiting responses to competing stimuli. Simultaneous processing is the ability to
integrate disparate parts into groups or an integrated whole. Successive processing is the
ability to recognize and sequential or serially order information. Since various parts o f the
brain are involved in different kinds o f information processing, the PASS theory does not
allow for a higher order g-factor.
Proponents o f the PASS model argue that planning has not been adequately
measured by other intellectual instruments, resulting in the misspecification o f specific
academic deficits associated with specific cognitive problems. As such, the Cognitive
Assessment System (CAS; Naglieri & Das, 1997) and revised version (CAS-2; Naglieri
et al., 2014) were developed, explicitly measuring processes that other psychometrically
derived measures o f intelligence have failed to assess.
However, despite the validation evidence supporting the criterion and
construct-related validity o f the CAS and CAS-2, evidence indicates that the abilities
measured by the PASS model are more consistent with the CHC model (Keith &
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Reynolds, 2010; Kranzler & Keith, 1999). Namely, when subjected to confirmatory
factor analysis, the PASS model produces a poor fit to the data. When competing
theoretical models are applied to the same data, the best model fit is provided by a
third-order hierarchical model with a general factor (g) of intelligence at the top, an
intermediate Planning/Attention factor, and four narrow facets associated with the PASS
abilities. Moreover, although the PASS model was bom out o f strong theoretical origins
and designed to measure non-g related abilities, when students were administered
measures, the g-factor derived from the CAS and g-factor o f the Woodcock-Johnson-III
correlated at .98 suggesting that the two are nearly indistinguishable (Keith, Kranzler, &
Flanagan, 2001). As such, the CAS appears to have the same measurement characteristics
o f the widely replicated CHC models.
The Nature of g and G f
Despite the attention that the theoretical accounts o f intelligence o f have received,
thus far none have shown the utility exhibited by the CHC model. Moreover, although
theoretical models o f intelligence deny the existence o f an overarching general mental
ability, when critically analyzed, these models show substantial relationships with g
(Brody, 2003; Keith et al., 2001; Visser et al., 2006). As such, despite attempts to
measure aspects o f intelligence that are independent o f g, the construct continues to
emerge. Thus, the measurement o f g remains the best estimate o f GMA.
As noted earlier, the strength o f the CHC model rests on its ability to serve as a
bridge from theory to practice, guiding the design and selection o f cognitive ability
instruments and batteries capturing the qualities that relate to our current understanding
o f intellectual functioning. Through multiple replications and substantial validation
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efforts, the CHC model has emerged as the most complete, structurally sound, and valid
model o f cognitive ability. Thus, most new measures o f cognitive abilities are based on
the CHC model, acknowledging its fidelity (Keith & Reynolds, 2010).
In order to capture the complete range o f mental abilities, the CHC prescribes a
battery o f assessments that provide the mosaic measurement o f intellect. Given that the
CHC model currently denotes 16 broad abilities and a host o f narrower facets, a complete
CHC-based assessment battery would necessitate a lengthy administration. In developing
measures o f cognitive ability or any other psychological construct, test developers are
faced with a tradeoff between thoroughness and accuracy. For example, the length o f a
test is directly related to its reliability (DeVellis, 2012). Using classical test theory, longer
tests are inherently more reliable since they capture items of increasing redundancy. In
doing so, error variance is reduced, providing a more focused and hence, reliable
measure. Thus, it would seem that an infinitely long measure would be desirable. Yet,
due to test taker fatigue, it is a commonly recommended practice in psychometrics to
consider reducing the number of items in a scale once the reliability coefficient reaches
an adequate threshold. This same sentiment is a consideration for assessment batteries
where a universe o f items is possible, but the administration o f a large number o f items
will result in test taker fatigue. A developer o f a test o f cognitive ability must balance the
creation o f a measure that covers the breadth o f mental abilities with the expediency of
producing useful and valid results.
The same tradeoff must be made when developing a more focused measure o f
general cognitive ability. Spearman’s psychometric g is implied through the positive
correlations among mental ability measures. Therefore, it is not possible to measure g
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with any single measure. Rather, intelligence is approximated through the aggregation of
highly g-saturated measures (Carroll, 1993). Similarly, Ackerman et al. (2005) notes that
the uses o f a single measure o f cognitive ability raises the possibility that s factors will be
captured in addition to g. Despite this, Ree, Earles, and Teachout (1994) have questioned
the practicality and necessity o f obtaining a comprehensive estimate o f cognitive ability
through an extensive battery o f mental measures. Likewise, Spearman recommended that
the use o f a single highly g-saturated measure is preferable to the use o f several
heterogeneous cognitive measures that capture a variety o f abilities (Spearman, 1927).
At Stratum 11 o f the CHC model, G f and Gc are the two most highly g-saturated
broad abilities, with G f more closely relate to g (Carroll, 1993). As originally conceived
by Cattell (1971), G f is used as a means to enhance other mental abilities, such as the
accumulation o f Gc through focused attention. As asserted by Gustafsson (1984,1989,
2001) and others, G f is indistinguishable from g when subjected to confirmatory factor
analyses. This suggests that fluid abilities represent the foundation o f general
intelligence. For instance, Arendasy, Hergovich, and Sommer (2008) tested the
g-saturation o f the Stratum II factors, finding that G f is virtually identical to psychometric
g. As such, G f measures produce large g-saturations even without averaging over several
subtests. Therefore, G f can be thought o f as the raw horsepower o f cognitive functioning,
indicative o f general mental ability.
However, contrary to the contention made by Gustafsson (1984, 1989, 2001), g
and G f do not appear to be the same construct. Rather, Carroll’s (2003) analysis
demonstrates that G /“ . . .is significantly separate and different from g, tending to
disconfirm any view that G f is identical to g” (p. 14). However, Carroll points out that the
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issue has not been completely resolved, speculating that it is likely difficult to develop a
measure o f G f that is reliably independent o f g, stating that "better tests o f G f are needed
to establish this factor as linearly independent o f factor g, if indeed this is possible..."
(Carroll, 2003, p. 19). Whatever qualities are associated with g, measures o f non-verbal
reasoning and novel problem solving through the use o f spatial elements and inductive
reasoning seem to best capture it. As such, tests o f G f are thought o f as good
approximations o f Spearman’s g (Ackerman et al., 2005).
While the types o f items that best capture G f are known, substantial confusion
surrounds the measurement o f the Gc construct. Adding to the confusion related to its
measurement, various terms such as crystalized intelligence, comprehension, and
academic achievement are used by professionals to describe the construct (Keith &
Reynolds, 2010). Gc implies a depth o f knowledge that would describe someone who
possesses a vast repository of information. However, as pointed out by Horn and
McArdle (2007), measures o f Gc rarely measure beyond surface knowledge. Likewise,
individuals who score well on Gc measures tend to have a wide breadth o f knowledge.
Therefore, it is impossible to distinguish the Gc abilities o f experts and those o f
individuals who have a superficial knowledge on a wide variety o f topics based solely on
Gc scores. As such, Gc scores may not be as useful as believed.
There is also reason to believe that Gc is becoming less relevant as technological
advances permeate society. Although Gc measures are good indicators o f academic and
business success from which hard work can positively influence test scores, advances in
computer technology can store far more information than any one person can accumulate,
holding it accurately, securely, and cheaply. That is, while crystalized knowledge is a
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repository o f information that comes with experience and education, Fumham (2008)
argues that the future belongs to quick-witted individuals who are able to think on their
feet, adapt to rapidly changing circumstances, and reason effectively.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that at its core, g is best tapped by G f
measures. As indicated by Cattell (1971), G f is the governor o f intellectual ability. Lesser
abilities are dependent on the investment o f Gf. Likewise, due to its high g-saturation,
tests consisting o f reasoning and novel problem solving abilities that are associated with
G f should be the predominant item types for brief measures o f GMA (Arendasy &
Sommer, 2012; Carroll, 1993, 2003; Gustafsson, 1984, 1989, 2001).
The Power of Intelligence
The relationship between intellect and success is most noticeable in academic
settings (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Dilchert, 2006) where measures o f intelligence are used
in predicting exam scores, amount o f learning, and academic success in schools and
universities, regardless o f the subject or specialty. Likewise, education has a strong
reciprocal impact on intelligence (Ceci, 1991). This relationship is important because it
leads to compounding life-advantages. As noted by Feldman (1966), individuals with
more education seek out and acquire more information. For instance, individuals who
obtain higher levels o f education use periodicals such as books, newspapers, and
magazines to a greater extent than their less educated peers. This is the precise reason that
higher cognitive ability promotes additional learning; higher levels o f g are associated
with increased exposure to information, which is in turn exploited to a greater degree
(Gottfredson, 2004).
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Skeptics o f g argue that intelligence is little more than an academic skill
(Sternberg et al., 2000). However, the non-academic value o f g has a clear and predicable
influence on occupational attainment, social life, and even one’s life span (Deary, 2004;
Gottfredson, 1997; Lubinski, 2004; O’Toole & Stankov, 1992; Schmidt & Hunter, 2004).
This general cognitive ability or ability to deal effectively with cognitive complexity
(Gottfredson, 1998) is the hallmark o f intelligence across contexts, allowing for the
processing o f information o f any sort, constituting the backbone o f human mental ability
(Gottfredson, 2004). For example, the effects that cognitive ability has on problem
solving and learning in everyday situations are robust (Gottfredson, 2002). Intellect is
shown to predict important life outcomes such as incarceration, poverty, health, and
mortality due to engaging in risky health behaviors (Gottfredson, 2004). Likewise, a
variety o f important occupation-related outcomes such as job performance, income level,
and occupational attainment are predicted by intelligence (Schmidt & Hunter, 2004).
Thus, the effects of g are pervasive because it is highly transportable. In other words,
there is a linear relationship between an individual’s level o f g and performance in
school, work, and social situations (Gottfredson, 2004). The general effect o f this
relationship results in greater life success, producing dividends across situations, time,
and cultures (Gottfredson, 2004; Nettlebeck & Wilson, 2005).
As argued by Gottfredson (2004), life itself can be thought o f as a cognitive
abilities test. There are virtually no aspects o f our daily lives, no matter how trivial, that
do not require the ability to reason, plan, or solve problems. For example, everyday
activities such as reading the directions listed in a recipe, determining how much to tip a
waiter at lunch, or reading a map exert a cognitive load, requiring the ability to reason
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and solve problems. As such, there are few situations where being less intelligent is
advantageous. However, the choices that are made on a daily basis produce compounding
returns that can result in large differences (Gottfredson, 2004). For example, there are
many reasons why someone may fail a given task that are unrelated to cognitive ability,
such as misreading the headline o f a newspaper or becoming lost while looking at a street
map in an unfamiliar city. The person may be distracted, tired, and/or hungry, but these
effects tend to be transient and unreliable. Conversely, the effects o f cognitive ability are
pervasive and fairly consistent across life situations. Just as casinos know that small
gaming odds in their favor can produce huge dividends over time, small edges in
cognitive ability aggregate and produce large effects over a lifetime (Gordon, Lewis, &
Quigley, 1988). Individuals with higher levels o f cognitive ability make better judgments
by exercising better problem-solving and reasoning abilities in everyday situations (e.g.,
managing finances or reading a map). In contrast, individuals who are less adept at
planning and budgeting slowly slip behind others who initially began with the same
resources. As such, when this slippage occurs, it occurs in many realms o f life, producing
pronounced effects. Moreover, these slippage effects are expected to become more
pronounced as the world becomes increasingly connected (Cascio & Aguinis, 2005).
Technological and societal advances have amplified the complexity o f daily life,
increasing the number o f choices that must be made, placing a premium on cognitive
ability (Gottfredson, 2003). As such, intelligence is more pervasive and inclusive than a
narrow abstract skill that allows one student to shine academically where another
languishes. Rather, cognitive ability is a broad intellectual capacity to interact with the
world effectively.
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Intelligence in the Workplace
Measures o f cognitive ability are among the most predictively valid employee
selection measures available to organizations (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Based on data
collected on over 32,000 employees in a variety o f jobs conducted for the U.S.
Department o f Labor (Hunter, 1980; Hunter & Hunter, 1984), meta-analytic evidence
indicates that the overall predictive validity o f cognitive ability to job performance is .51
for jobs o f median complexity (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Since performance data are
only available for those applicants who are hired, Hunter, Schmidt, & Le (2006) estimate
that the true validity coefficient o f cognitive ability may be well over .60 once corrected
for range restrictions.
The predictive validity o f cognitive ability also rises as job complexity increases
(Ones et al., 2006; Schmidt, Hunter, & Pearlman, 1981). The most complex jobs are
those that are abstract, cannot be routinized, and are autonomous, thus allowing workers
to exercise more discretion (Schmidt & Hunter, 2004). As such, complex jobs place a
premium on workers’ ability to reason, solve problems, and make judgments without
supervision. For instance, Hunter and Hunter (1984) reported that the highest mean
validity o f cognitive ability that they found was for professional-managerial jobs (.58),
followed by highly technical jobs (.56), medium complexity jobs (.51), semi-skilled jobs
(.40), and unskilled laborer (.23). Conversely, only in the lowest, least complex, and most
routinized positions, do constructs such as tenure and psychomotor abilities better predict
on-the-job performance than cognitive ability (Gottfredson, 2002). Moreover, since the
utility o f a selection device is directly tied to its validity (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), the
dividends o f using valid selection devices can reach millions o f dollars over time,

whereas organizations that make poor decisions using invalid instruments stand to lose
millions o f dollars in reduced production.
The relationship between possessing a high intellect and employment success has
been known to researchers for quite some time. For example, Harrell and Harrell (1945)
noted that employees o f lower intelligence were less likely to rise up the organizational
hierarchy to obtain the prestigious “white-collar” positions. This assertion is buttressed
by U.S. Employment Service data, showing a strong correlation (.72) between cognitive
ability and job level (Jensen, 1998). However, cognitive ability has also been shown to
predict job movement into positions o f either higher or lower complexity. For instance,
using a sample o f 3,887 young adults, Wilk, Desmarais, and Sackett (1995) demonstrated
that cognitive ability measured in 1980 predicted job movement over a five-year period
(1982-1987). Specifically, the results o f this study show that individuals with greater
cognitive ability tended to move up the organizational hierarchy while those with less
cognitive ability moved down. In a follow-up study, Wilk and Sackett (1996) found that
job mobility was predicted by the congruence o f cognitive ability and job complexity.
Individuals who possessed a cognitive ability that was greater than the complexity o f
their job tended to move into positions o f greater complexity. Conversely, individuals
who possessed a cognitive ability that was less than the level o f complexity o f the job
tended to move into less complex positions. Likewise, greater variability in cognitive
ability scores are seen in less complex positions, but a consistent upper range o f scores
are found across occupations suggesting a minimal level o f intellect is required as one
rises in the hierarchy (Harrell & Harrell, 1945). Thus, while people o f high intelligence
occupy low complexity jobs, access to higher-level positions require greater levels of
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cognitive ability. This point is also echoed by Gottfredson (2004) who indicates that in
the United States, the most coveted and highest paying jobs go to the cognitive elite,
while the less cognitively endowed workers are doomed to a life o f menial labor and low
pay in our informationally based economy. As such, it quite literally pays to be smart.
The relationship between cognitive ability and job success is not limited to the
United States. The findings o f Schmidt and Hunter (1998) and Ones et al. (2006) are
reinforced by Salgado, Anderson, Moscoso, Bertua, and De Fruyt (2003) who conducted
a similar meta-analytic investigation o f the relationship between intelligence and
on-the-job performance in a European sample consisting o f over 25,000 workers. After
corrections were made for measurement error, the findings o f this study suggest that the
operational validity o f cognitive ability is .62, but the value was smaller for specific
forms of intelligence. Similarly, Bertua, Anderson, and Salgado (2005) and Hulsheger,
Maier, and Stumpp (2007) examined cognitive ability in British and German samples,
respectively. Consistent with previous findings, the data revealed that as job complexity
increases, the predictive validity o f cognitive ability increases. In sum, not only do the
data suggest that cognitive ability is the single best predictor o f occupational success for
any occupation or industry, but cognitive ability is the best predictor o f job performance
internationally too.
Why Does Cognitive Ability Affect Performance?
Although the link between cognitive ability and job performance is strong, why is
the relationship so robust? As suggested by Schmidt and Hunter (2004), cognitive ability
is thought to influence performance indirectly. Cognitive ability allows for the faster and
more thorough absorption o f essential job knowledge. In turn, the information learned is
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exploited to a greater degree, allowing employees to go beyond their current knowledge
of the job and to make judgments in novel and changing situations. Similarly, Borman,
Hanson, Oppler, Pulakis, and White (1993) suggest that the relationship between
intelligence and job performance is mediated. Higher intelligence results in individuals
having more opportunities to obtain additional job experience. The experience gained
then leads to additional job knowledge.
Given the vast amount o f evidence showing the relationship between cognitive
ability and job performance, it is no surprise that higher cognitive ability is also related to
employee training outcomes. Schmidt & Hunter (1998) report that no other measure has
the predictive power of cognitive ability (r = .56) in predicting training success.
Moreover, similar results (r = .54) were found when intelligence was used to predict
training performance in European samples (Salgado et al., 2003). Thus, when an
employer uses cognitive ability as a selection measure, the employer is also selecting
individuals who are better able to rapidly learn on the job. Consequently, Schmidt and
Hunter (1998) recommend that cognitive ability should be considered the primary tool for
selection decisions.
Adverse Impact
Despite the high predictive validity and other advantages associated with
cognitive ability testing, organizations remain hesitant to use such devices to make
employment decisions due to the consistent and near universal finding that cognitive
ability measures produce differential scoring across racial subgroups (Campbell, 1996;
Hartigan & Wigdor, 1989; Sackett & Ellingson, 1997). Specifically, lower than average
scores are observed in African-American and Hispanic samples, while groups such as
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Asian-Americans tend score higher than average (Rushton & Jensen, 2005). Comparing
racial subgroups, African-Americans score about 1 standard deviation in the population
lower than Caucasians, while Japanese and Chinese samples obtain the highest scores.
As a result, occupational outcomes can be partially explained by the gap in
cognitive ability scores. According to Gottfredson (2002), only about 22% o f Caucasians
and 59% o f African-Americans produce cognitive ability scores below 90. As such, fewer
African-Americans are considered competitive for mid-level jobs and trades such as
firefighters and clerical workers. The average cognitive ability score for incumbent to
these types o f jobs is one standard deviation above the average score o f
African-Americans. Conversely, on the other end o f the continuum, the ratio o f
African-Americans to Caucasians producing cognitive ability scores o f 125 or greater is
1:30 the average for the most socially desirable professional positions such as lawyers,
physicians, and engineers.
Despite the racial gap in cognitive ability scores noted in the general population,
McDaniel and Banks (2010) argue that for two reasons, these differences should be less
pronounced when actual job applicants compete for jobs. First, individuals at the lowest
levels of cognitive ability do not have the mental capabilities to perform effectively in
common jobs and therefore are not job applicants. Second, job applicants must meet
minimal job requirements (e.g., education and experience) when applying for a position.
Pools of qualified job applicants who have obtained formal education and possess the
requisite relevant job experience are more likely to be homogenous in respect to
cognitive ability than random samples drawn from the general population. Therefore, due
to the pre-screening o f applicant qualifications, larger racial gaps in cognitive ability
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scores are more likely to be found in lower level jobs that do not require lofty education
and experience requirements. Conversely, smaller racial gaps should be noted in
positions that require high levels o f education and experience. Substantiation o f this
assertion is provided by Roth, BeVier, Bobko, Switzer, and Tyler (2001) who note that
the standardized mean difference between white and black applicants shrinks from 1.0 in
the general population, to .86 for low complexity jobs, .72 for medium-complexity jobs,
and .63 for high-complexity jobs.
Despite the reduction in test score differences seen across job complexity, the
observed deviations can still cause disparate hiring practices if cognitive ability measures
were used as the sole selection instrument. As such, challenges to the legality o f cognitive
ability testing began in 1971 with the influential Griggs v. Duke Power (1971) case. As a
result of this case, the Supreme Court ruled that when a selection procedure or device
produces adverse impact against a protected group, the organization must be able to
demonstrate that the use o f the measure is a “business necessity,” imperative to
organizational functioning and operation. However, as indicated by Grover (1996), courts
have generally held rather narrow interpretations on what constitutes a business necessity
that hamper the use o f alternative selection options. As a result, many organizations
curtailed their usage o f cognitive ability measures in making employment decisions.
The Measurement of Cognitive Ability
Despite the legal challenges that surround cognitive-ability measures, Nisbett et
al. (2012) believe that the measurement o f intelligence is one o f the greatest
accomplishments o f psychology. As stated by DeVellis (2012), “measurement is a
fundamental activity o f science” (p. 2). As such, despite cognitive theorists who have
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devised theoretical accounts o f intelligence that elude measurement, Cronbach (1990)
notes, “If a thing exists, it exists in some amount. If it exists in some amount, it can be
measured” (p. 34).
The History of Testing and Measurement
The historical roots o f measurement stretch into antiquity. Duncan (1984) argues
that measurement is an inherently social process that emerged in ancient humans as a
means to overcome the problems faced on a daily basis as opposed to an attempt to
satisfy scientific curiosities. For example, ancient people were able to determine basic
measurements such as length, distance, volume, weight, and time as a means to solve
practical problems (Duncan, 1984). This assertion is backed by biblical references to the
use of measurement and the writings o f Aristotle mentioning civil officials checking
weights and measures.
The first documented use o f psychological testing dates back to 2,200 B.C. China
where public officials were obligated to participate in civil service examinations every
three years (DuBois, 1970). This competitive exam system assessed a variety of
competencies such as archery, military affairs, agriculture, horsemanship, revenue,
geography, music, writing, Confusion principles, knowledge o f ceremonies, and civil
laws. Examinees who scored well obtained appointments to governmental positions.
Although these exams were rudimentary by modem standards, anecdotal evidence
suggests a positive impact was produced, reducing the biases associated with nepotism
and other political manipulations.
Darwin. Nevertheless, the roots o f intelligence testing are embedded in the work
o f evolutionary theory and the use o f systematic observation. According to Charles
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Darwin’s theory of evolution, the natural environment cannot support the reproductive
capacity o f organisms, leading to a struggle to survive (Darwin, 1859). Non-systematic
mutations in the offspring o f organisms result in variations or individual differences.
These differences provide the offspring with adaptations which are more or less
conducive to survival (Mader, 1996). As a result, when placed in a given environment,
the characteristics that promote survival evolve through a natural process. Thus, over
time, species undergo a slow transmutation whereby the characteristics that are associated
with survival in a habitat occur with greater regularity.
Through his systematic observations o f the variations across species, Darwin set
in motion the development o f scientific and statistical methods, producing a widespread
impact on the field o f modem psychology (Hergenhahn, 2009). For example, the roots o f
child and developmental psychology, comparative psychology, learning, abnormal
psychology, testing and measurement, and, o f course, evolutionary psychology can be
traced directly to Darwin. In doing so, Darwin stimulated a curiosity in studying
individual differences, raising questions regarding the link between human and animal
intelligence.
Galton. The next major leap in the study o f individual differences was advanced
by Darwin’s half-cousin, Francis Galton. Galton shared Darwin’s infatuation with
systematic observation (Clayes, 2001). In fact, Galton was so enamored with
measurement that he attempted to measure a variety o f phenomena such as the
effectiveness o f prayer (he did not find it effective), the degree o f boredom at science
lectures, and determine which country had the most beautiful women (Galton, 1883).
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Galton is also credited with suggesting the use o f fingerprints as personal identification, a
practice later adopted by Scotland Yard (Forrest, 1974).
However, Gabon’s greatest advances to the field o f measurement came when he
opened the Anthropometric Laboratory in London’s Health Exhibition. Visitors to the
laboratory paid three or four pence each to have their sensory and motor abilities
assessed, or for a smaller fee (two pence) an individual could be measured again at
another time. In a little over a year, Galton collected measures on 9,337 subjects on
variables such as height (standing), height (sitting), weight, arm span, lung capacity, pull
strength, grip strength, keenness o f sight, speed o f blow (the time taken for someone to
punch a pad), color discrimination, memory o f form, hand steadiness, length o f the
middle finger, and auditory acuity (the ability to perceive or discriminate auditory tones)
(Hergenhahn, 2009; Hothersall, 1995). Each individual received a copy o f the results and
Galton kept a copy on file (Irvine, 1986). Later, these data lead to the development o f
core statistical concepts such as correlation, regression to the mean, and the realization
that as compared to mean (average) scores, median scores were less influenced by
extreme scores (Bynum, 2002).
Galton was primarily interested in the inheritance o f anatomical and cognitive
abilities. According to Galton, intelligence was related to sensory acuity (Forrest, 1974).
That is, the outside world is taken in through the senses. As such, individuals who
possess keen senses were better able to acquire information. Since Galton believed that
one’s sensory acuity was directly related to intelligence, his laboratory is seen as the first
effort to measure intelligence. However, Galton’s contribution to the field o f
measurement is further realized through substantial methodological advances such as the

development o f the first assessment battery, a collection o f sensory and motor measures.
Likewise, many psychometric instruments in use today can be traced back to the work of
Galton including rating scales, questionnaires, and self-report inventories (Hergenhahn,
2009).
Cattell. The popularization of psychological measurement in the United States is
traced to the work o f James McKeen Cattell. In addition to forming the first
undergraduate psychology laboratory in the United States at the University o f
Pennsylvania, Cattell coined the term “mental test” (Cattell, 1890; Cattell, 1928;
Hergenhahn, 2009). Moreover, Cattell is largely responsible for the encouragement of
mental-testing research through his founding o f several influential publications such as
Psychology Review Science and American Men o f Science. Likewise, Cattell founded
the Psychological Corporation, which continues to be an industry leader in psychological
testing and assessment.
From a methodological standpoint, Cattell introduced some critical assumptions
about the validity o f cognitive ability measures. For example, Cattell noted that if
Galtonian measures were all measuring the same thing (i.e., intelligence), then they
should all be highly correlated. Likewise, if a test is measuring intelligence, then it should
demonstrate a substantial relationship with other indices o f intelligence such as academic
success. However, through his research, Cattell noted that Galtonian measures failed to
demonstrate substantial relationships with one another or with other practical measures o f
intelligence such as college success (Guilford, 1967; Sternberg, 1990). As a result,
sensory measures were deemed invalid indicators o f intelligence and the interest in such
measures faded.

Binet. Unlike Galton and Cattell who relied on sensory abilities as a proxy
measure of intelligence, Alfred Binet proposed the study o f mental abilities directly, by
measuring higher mental processes through the use o f variables such as memory,
imagination, imagery, comprehension, attention, suggestibility, aesthetic judgment, force
o f will, moral judgment, and visual space judgment. Binet and Theodore Simon were
commissioned by the French government to study children with mental retardation in
French schools, culminating in the development o f the Binet-Simon Scale o f Intelligence,
consisting of 30 tasks arranged in order o f difficulty (Fancher, 1985). The measure was
able to distinguish the performance o f normal functioning and mentally delayed children,
but later revisions also distinguished levels o f intelligence in normal children, and
provided normative information on adults (Siegler, 1992). Coupled with the addition o f
William Stem’s coining of the term “mental age,” a child’s intelligence quotient (IQ)
could be calculated as the child’s mental age as derived from the Binet-Simon, divided by
their chronological age (Fancher, 1985; Hergenhahn, 2009). The scale was again revised
again by Lewis Terman, this time for American test takers, and validated against
academic achievement ratings demonstrating the veracity o f the test (Minton, 1988). The
revised measure created by Terman is known as the Stanford-Binet Scale (Roid, 2005;
White, 2000) and remains a measure o f cognitive abilities.
Yerkes. The next major advance in cognitive assessment came as World War I
dawned. The United States Army was faced with the problem o f systematically
evaluating and classifying the cognitive ability and emotional functioning o f new soldiers
(Boake, 2002). The influx o f young men into the Army necessitated a method to quickly
and efficiently assess and identify soldiers for selective training (e.g., officer training).
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Robert Yerkes became familiar with intelligence testing while working at the
Boston Psychopathic Hospital, suggesting a new scoring method to the Binet-Simon scale
in which test takers are administered all items o f the Binet-Simon scale, receiving credit
(points) for the items passed (Hergenhahn, 2009). As such, intelligence could be
measured by the items passed rather than by IQ, removing age as a factor and broadening
the statistical analyses that could be performed leading to higher quality inference.
However, the scoring and administration system devised by Yerkes had another benefit.
Since the administration o f the scale was not dependent on the age or ability level o f the
test taker, the items could be administered in a group setting.
When commissioned to develop an assessment device for soldiers, Yerkes
maintained that such a test must measure innate intelligence and be easily administered
and scored. The result was the Army Alpha, introduced in 1917, measuring verbal ability,
knowledge or information, and ability to follow directions (Dahlstrom, 1985). A
non-verbal equivalent version o f the measure, the Army Beta, was introduced and
administered to illiterate and non-English speaking soldiers. When testing was halted in
1919 following the end o f the war, over 1.75 million people had been tested (Larson,
1994; McGuire, 1994). The success o f the Army Alpha and Army Beta has led to the
widespread use o f group testing in schools and industry.
Cognitive Ability Testing in the Modern Era
Riding on the success o f the Army Alpha and Army Beta, the use of
paper-and-pencil cognitive ability measures has gained considerable popularity. The most
commonly used measure o f adult intelligence is the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale,
currently in its fourth edition (WAIS-IV; Wechsler, Coalson, & Raiford, 2008).
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Explicitly, Wechsler’s tests are designed to measure “the global capacity o f a person to
act purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively with his/her environment”
(Wechsler, 1939, p. 229). As such, the WAIS-IV, which consists o f 15 subtests, is
primarily used in clinical settings due to the lengthy administration time, which is
typically well over an hour. However, in occupational settings, where shorter measures
are preferred, a comprehensive measure is neither required nor feasible
(Chamorro-Premuzic, & Fumham, 2010).
Currently, the most widely used cognitive ability instrument in personnel
assessment is the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT; Hunter, 1989; Wonderlic, 1992;
Wonderlic, 2007). The WPT is a brief measure o f cognitive ability that can be completed
in approximately 15 minutes. Examinees are asked to answer as many o f the 50
free-response verbal, quantitative, and spatial ability WPT items as possible within the
allotted time limit (12 minutes). Despite its popularity, the relationship between WPT
scores and intelligence is unclear. For instance, Bell, Matthews, Lassiter, and Leverett
(2002) examined the relationship between WPT scores and the Kaufman Adult and
Adolescent Intelligence Test (KAIT) finding the Wonderlic to be a robust predictor of
both G f and Gc. Conversely, Matthews and Lassiter (2007) conducted a similar study,
examining the relationship between WPT scores and the Woodcock-Johnson-Revised
(WJ-R), demonstrating that the Wonderlic is related to Gc but not Gf. As such, while
WPT scores have been shown to reliably predict acquired knowledge, WPT have not
been shown a reliable predictor o f novel reasoning abilities. Likewise, the predictive
power o f WPT scores may be sample dependent whereas measures o f G f demonstrate
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robust relationships regardless o f the administration samples (Hicks, Harrison, & Engle,
2015).
Another popular measure o f cognitive ability, the Raven’s Progressive Matrices
Test (RPMT; Raven, Raven, & Court, 2003), is considered by some to be the best single
measure o f G f and GMA available (Jensen, 1998; Nisbett et al., 2012). The RPMT is a
“test o f observation and clear thinking” (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1978, p. 3), requiring
the examinee to inspect a matrix o f geometric shapes linked by a common rule and
extrapolate the next figure in the matrix that would satisfy the rule from several
alternatives. Consisting o f 60 items, the RPMT can be administered in 20 minutes and
has been used extensively in the United States and the United Kingdom to make
personnel selection decisions (Bertua et al., 2005; Jensen, 1998; Raven, Court, & Raven,
1998). Due to the non-verbal nature o f the RPMT, it can be used across cultures without
the need for item translations. As such, the terms culture-free (Cattell, 1940), culture-fair
(Cattell & Cattell, 1963), and culture-reduced (Jensen, 1980) are all used to describe the
Raven’s and other similar non-verbal measures that require little cultural knowledge to
answer test items. The advantage o f culture-fair measures o f cognitive ability is that they
are thought to reduce the adverse impact seen in more culturally-loaded cognitive
measures. Although culturally-fair tests have thus far not been shown to eliminate the
adverse impact associated with measures o f cognitive ability (Arvey & Faley, 1988),
evidence suggests that reductions in adverse impact are obtainable using such measures
over global intelligence measures (Hausdorf, LeBlanc, & Chawla, 2003).
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Computer-Based Testing
Over the last 20 years, affordable, reliable, portable, and powerful computers have
become a ubiquitous feature of our modem society, as seen in the omnipresence of
desktop computers, laptops, tablets, and smartphones (Chernyshenko & Stark, 2015).
Coupled with advances in online technology, computers offer an array o f possibilities in
the selection and presentation o f assessment items, as well as where testing takes place
(Sireci & Zenisky, 2006; Zenisky & Sireci, 2013). While early computerized assessments
were little more than direct translations o f paper-and-pencil measures (Barak & English,
2002), researchers are creating innovative computerized assessments that take advantage
of the computing power afforded by such ubiquitous devices (e.g., Condon & Revelle,
2014). The technological revolution has led computerized assessment to rival the use o f
traditional pencil-and-paper methods as the dominate medium (Weiss, 2011).
No longer are assessments restricted by the limitations associated with traditional
paper-and-pencil methods, such as static text statements and graphics. Rather, stimuli can
be presented either audibly through computer speakers/headphones or graphically,
moving through space on a computer monitor. The dynamic capabilities o f computers
allow for the creation and presentation o f creative item formats previously unavailable to
test developers. For example, three-dimensional computerized simulations and digital
media are increasing the range o f knowledge, skills, and other attributes that can be
measured (Bartram, 2006; Jacobs & Chase, 1992; Zenisky & Sireci, 2002). Likewise,
complex items that change over time can be created to improve the coverage o f the
constructs measured and their associated cognitive processes (Drasgow &
Olson-Buchanan, 1999; Parshall & Harmes, 2009). For example, measures can be made

o f mouse or joystick movements or the time that elapses between item presentation and
response, expanding the type and amount o f information that can be obtained regarding
test taker performance. As such, not only can the veracity o f an examinee’s response be
called into question if only a few milliseconds elapsed between presentation o f the item
and the elicitation of a response (i.e., he or she did not read the question), but
computerized testing allows for the complex scoring o f the processes associated with
producing a response (DiCerbo & Behrens, 2012).
Beyond the innovative item formats that are afforded by computerized testing,
when coupled with the worldwide reach o f the Internet, the benefits to organizations are
staggering. For instance, organizations can reach a vast pool o f potential applicants
around the globe using a variety o f measures without incurring the costs associated with
printing and distributing measures via mail (Naglieri et al., 2004). As such, Internet-based
test administration is more scalable and efficient than traditional pencil-and-paper
measures all while presenting a consistent and positive image or culture to applicants o f a
company that uses advanced technology to staff employees (Tippins, 2009). Online
measures also promote the standardization o f measurement, uniformly presenting all test
items in the exact same manner while improving the speed o f processing applicants
(Drasgow & Mattem, 2006; Drasgow & Olson-Buchanan, 1999; Tippins, 2009; Thurlow,
Lazarus, Albus, & Hodgson, 2010; van der Linden & Glas, 2010). Due to these immense
advantages, organizations see computer and Internet-based testing as an appealing
alternative to traditional paper-and-pencil measures (Karim, Kaminsky, & Behrend,
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Test Security Specific to Technology-Based Testing
Despite the advantages associated with computerized assessment, as with any
technological advance, new and exploitable security threats arise. These security threats
have caused some organizations to be hesitant to completely abandon the use o f
paper-and-pencil measures (Castella-Roca, Herrera-Joancomarti, & Dorca-Josa, 2006).
Test security refers to a number o f issues surrounding the test taker’s ability to “cheat” or
manipulate assessment scores through tactics such as possessing prior knowledge o f the
items, using outside sources, or using outsiders to answer test items (Karim et al., 2014).
Online assessment is typically conducted in an unproctored testing environment,
providing examinees a multitude o f options to cheat, such as surfing the Internet or
communicating with others to locate test answers (Al-Saleem & Ullah, 2014). Likewise,
the proliferation o f technological devices, such as smart phones, allow test takers to
photograph, record, or otherwise document test content, and receive information virtually
undetectably even under proctored conditions (Reynolds & Dickter, 2010). As such,
although similar results are obtained from cognitive measures administered on computers
and via traditional paper and pencil methods (Mead & Drasgow, 1993; Randall, Sireci,
Li, & Kaira, 2012), practitioners and researchers have raised concerns that unproctored
environments provide too great an opportunity to cheat. Consequently, test developers
have warned against the administration o f cognitive ability measures via online media
(Naglieri et al., 2004).
Test security is a critical issue for test developers because it directly affects the
validity o f a measure (Foster, 2010). The use o f impermissible sources or possessing
prior knowledge o f test items artificially inflates an examinee’s score on the construct o f
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interest. When compared to the scores o f examinees that did not benefit from such a
nefarious advantage, it erroneously appears that differing levels o f the construct of
interest are possessed. As such, any judgments or inferences based on compromised
measures cannot be justified (Karim et al., 2014). Likewise, reductions in a test’s validity
directly affect its utility, which can have staggering financial implications for
organizations (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998).
Security threats can be classified into six general categories o f cheating (Foster,
2010). Threats include pre-exposing the test taker to test content, using a proxy to take
the test, receiving help from someone at the exam center, using inappropriate aids during
the assessment, hacking into the scoring database to raise or lower test scores, and
copying the responses o f another person during the exam. All of these methods represent
an inappropriate or possibly illegal way in which test takers have attempted to inflate
their assessment scores. However, none o f these threats is limited to computer-based
testing (Meyer & Zhu, 2013) and as such should not deter organizations from using such
measures. Rather, these concerns shed light on designing and implementing improved
methods to mitigate or eliminate such risks.
The most serious threat to exam security concerns test takers obtaining prior
exposure to the test content (Foster, 2010). As compared to other threats to test security,
prior knowledge o f test content is often obtained inexpensively and with relative ease
making it difficult to discriminate between honest and dishonest test takers. Moreover,
the risk o f being caught with prior knowledge o f test content is extremely low. For
example, an examinee may be provided information regarding the types o f questions
asked or specific item content and the associated correct answers prior to the

administration. This form o f cheating may be accomplished on computerized assessments
by taking screenshots or otherwise documenting the items administered and then
subsequently sharing the content with future test takers (Cook & Eignor, 1991). This
problem is further compounded as testing windows become larger as is seen when
organizations must continuously screen applicants (Croft, 2014). For instance, if
thousands o f examinees complete a measure comprised o f the same items, the risk o f
sharing items increases greatly over time. This phenomenon was observed on a large
scale by Asian students sitting for the Graduate Records Exam (GRE; Kyle, 2002).
Examinees sitting for the exam at the beginning o f the testing window copied exam
content and shared it via online message boards. As a result, abnormally high scores were
observed in the following months from countries such as China. Alarmed, GRE officials
launched an investigation and uncovered websites containing exact test item content. As
a result, the computerized version o f the GRE was discontinued in the region, allowing
only the paper-and-pencil version. Similarly, many organizations use only a single test
form from which personnel decisions are based. As such, given a short measure,
likeminded conspirators could memorize an entire scale in only a few administrations
(Drasgow et al., 2009).
Combating Test-Security Issues
Traditionally, item sharing and other test security concerns have been combated
by creating multiple forms o f the same measure (Cook & Eignor, 1991). For example, 16
alternate forms o f the WPT are available for use (Wonderlic, 1983). However,
developing alternate forms is costly in both the time and financial resources required to
generate them. As such, few alternate test forms are in use today (Freund & Holling,
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2011). Moreover, while multiple forms may reduce an examinee’s ability to memorize
items from one administration to the next, developing parallel forms that are o f similar
content, difficulty, and reliability through traditional test development methods is
virtually impossible, resulting in inequities across test forms (Cook & Eignor, 1991).
Therefore, despite attempts to improve test security and fairness, test developers could
inadvertently create a measure that is unfair in other respects.
Another method used to curb cheating is computer adaptive testing (CAT; Weiss,
2011). CAT creates a personalized test administration tailored to the examinee’s ability
level (Baylari & Montazer, 2009). Based on item response theory (IRT) methodology,
CAT assumes that the test taker’s ability level (i.e., amount o f the latent trait) can be
estimated by administering items o f varying levels o f difficulty. Examinees that possess
greater ability levels of the latent trait are more likely to pass items o f higher difficulty.
Conversely, individuals with lower levels o f the same trait may only pass items o f lesser
difficulty. Likewise, items that more finely discriminate a test taker’s performance at a
given ability level are said to provide more information at a given ability level since the
ability level in question is tested more precisely. CAT takes advantage o f IRT scaling by
administering items o f greater or lesser difficulty until the test taker’s ability level can be
estimated with an acceptable level o f certainty (Babcock & Weiss, 2012; Weiss, 2011).
Given that different items are administered to different examinees, some o f the issues
surrounding test security are addressed, but inequities in the items presented across test
administrations may still exist. Likewise, advanced item exposure methods have sought
to reduce test security concerns by controlling the frequency with which items are
presented to specific geographic regions or time periods by adjusting a control parameter
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of an item exposure algorithm based on repetitive simulations (Chang & Ansley, 2003).
However, CAT and item exposure algorithms do not prohibit test users from
photographing or otherwise recording the items and distributing them to future test users.
As such, given a large enough samples o f test takers, test security in a CAT environment
with exposure controls remains an issue necessitating the continual monitoring o f item
statistics to locate abnormal improvement in examinee performance (Drasgow &
Mattem, 2006).
While the use o f multiple test forms and CAT have been shown to reduce
small-scale cheating, these methods require very large item pools (Drasgow et al., 2009).
For instance, it is estimated that at least 2,000 items are needed to administer a 40-item
CAT licensure exam twice a year (Breithaupt, Ariel, & Hare, 2009). As such, human test
developers are strained to keep up with the demand for high quality items. Item
generation is also a time consuming and costly process (Geerlings et al., 2011; Wainer,
2002). For instance, it is estimated that 10% o f Educational Testing Service’s (ETS) total
testing costs are directly related to item writing (Wainer, 2002). Rudner (2009) suggested
that development costs associated with the generation o f a single item for a high-stakes
licensure exam range from $1,500 to $2,000. As such, when Breithaupt et al.’s (2009)
estimated number of items needed to create a 40-item item bank is combined with
Rudner’s (2009) cost-per-item estimate, the cost o f the development o f a high-stakes
examination could reach $4,000,000.
However, not all items are created equal and the items generated by human test
developers are often o f questionable quality. The items created by human content
specialists do not always conform to the construct o f interest, nor can humans develop

53

items that are o f greater difficulty than they can conceived, placing a ceiling on the range
of items that are possible (Homke & Habon, 1986). The costs associated with test
development are further increased as a substantial number o f the items created by human
developers must be eliminated from the item pool due to insufficient psychometric
characteristics. For instance, Henryssen (1971) estimates that between 20 percent to 80
percent o f the items generated by human test developers must be discarded during the test
development process due to flaws. Thus, the use o f automatic test development
procedures has gained increased attention for the creation o f cognitive ability measures,
which are known to contribute to the prediction o f occupational success (e.g., Schmidt &
Hunter, 2004).
Automatic Item Generation
Given the need to quickly and efficiently generate large pools o f items, automatic
item generation (AIG) is a rapidly advancing field with roots in cognitive theory,
computer technology, and psychometrics (Bejar et al., 2003). Also known as rule-based
item construction, AIG is an alternative approach to traditional item development using
computer technology to generate items based on item models and a set o f rules (i.e.,
algorithm) that define item complexity (Gierl et al., 2015). The aim o f AIG is to generate
a large number o f items that require little or no human review prior to administration
(Doebler & Holling, 2015). Developing items in an AIG framework solves several o f the
practical issues associated with traditional test development. For instance, given an item
model and a set o f rules, AIG increases the flexibility o f test administration through the
generation o f large pools of items o f varying complexity with a negligible investment o f
time and money, reducing item exposure concerns (Geerlings et al., 2011). Additionally,
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since the items are generated through algorithms, precise information regarding how the
items were constructed, their relation to the construct in question, and their psychometric
properties is known (Geerlings et al., 2011). Moreover, the variety o f AIG item types that
can be created is ever expanding with research supporting their psychometric
characteristics and test-retest applications (Arendasy & Sommer, 2013; Freund &
Holling, 2011). As such, AIG is an attractive method for developing cognitive ability
items (Freund, Hofer, & Holling, 2008; Poinstingl, 2009).
Under the AIG paradigm, item models (Bejar, 2002) serve as the basic structure
upon which future items will be generated. Item models are either selected from exiting
measures or uniquely created in such a way that the features o f the model can be
manipulated to create new items (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012; Gierl & Haladyna, 2012).
That is, new items are generated from item models by specifying the construct-relevant
features that can be varied, providing researchers a foundation for making inferences
regarding test taker ability (Alves, Gierl, & Lai, 2010; Gierl et al., 2015).
Item model features known as “radicals” (Irvine, 2002), maximize the
content-related variance in the items generated. That is, radical features define the
processes or actions required to answer items. It is assumed that radicals systematically
impact the psychometric characteristics (e.g., item difficulty) o f items since they are
selected based on the cognitive processes that test takers use to solve items. That is,
radicals define the elements that are critical to solving an item and thus relate directly to
item difficulty. Items that share radicals of the same complexity also share the same
psychometric characteristics, such as measuring the same construct and item parameters
(Doebler & Holling, 2015). Moreover, radicals can be varied independently o f one
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another or used in tandem to generate an array o f items that exhibit varying psychometric
qualities (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012; Gierl et al., 2015). As such, researchers can create
items of varying difficulty by manipulating o f one or more radical elements. Thus,
radicals improve the usefulness o f the inferences that can be drawn from test taker
performance since they allow for a widened range o f the content domain to be tapped
(Alves et al., 2010).
Unlike radicals, “incidentals” serve as the basis for generating variation in the
surface features o f items (Irvine, 2002) that do not directly relate to item difficulty.
Incidentals do not exert an effect on the psychometric characteristics o f an item, but
rather change the “look” o f items, creating variation within items o f the same difficulty
(Bejar et al., 2003). As such, the similarity among items with regard to psychometric
characteristics is caused by radicals whereas item dissimilarity in terms o f item
appearance is caused by incidentals.
While it is a basic assumption o f AIG that the effect o f radicals affect test-taker
performance in a similar way, this assumption may not hold in specific situations
(Geerlings et a l, 2011). That is, test takers may use different strategies to arrive at the
same solution. In such circumstances, researches familiar with the cognitive processes
used to answer items, as well as the radicals and incidents used to generate items, may
not the potential for interference among the generative elements. As such, functional
constraints (Arendasy et al., 2008) can be specified to omit certain combinations of
radicals and/or incidentals that produce invalid test items, or items that interfere with the
cognitive processes required to answer the question (Geerlings et al., 2012). For example,
a researcher creating a mathematical ability measure may constrain the largest number
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that will be used in multiplication items to be less than 10 and omit all items that require
the test taker to multiply by zero. These constrains not only serve as a quality control
mechanism in AIG, but also avoid the generation o f items that lead to solving items
through the use o f cognitive processes unrelated to the construct o f interest and potential
differential item functioning (Penfield & Camilli, 2007).
Moreover, since radicals exert a consistent effect on item difficulty, the effects of
the radicals can be used to pre-calibrate items. As such, through the generation o f items
directly from previously calibrated item radicals and the random application o f
incidentals, items can be generated on the fly with predicable psychometric
characteristics (Bejar et al., 2003). On-the-fly item generation is advantageous in that a
large number o f items are created in a fully automated fashion directly from calibrated
radicals that define the item or item families (Geerlings et al., 2012). Moreover, test
security concerns are lessened in that each test taker is provided a unique experience.
Item Model Development
As is the case in traditional item development, the expertise and creativity o f
content specialists is critical to designing meaningful AIG item models (Gierl, Lai, &
Turner, 2012). Several published examples o f the procedures and methods that
researchers have used to generate item models exist (e.g., Arendasy & Sommer, 2012;
Doebler & Holling, 2015; Freund et al., 2008; Geerlings et al., 2012; Gierl et al., 2015).
However, despite the range o f available tactics, AIG item modeling best practices is an
under-researched area (Gierl & Lai, 2012).
As described by Arendasy and Sommer (2012), the number o f useable items that
are generated is related to the theoretical backing o f the item model used in item
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construction. According to the authors, three AIG methods have been successfully used
to generate cognitive ability items: (a) item modeling, (b) cognitive design system
approach, and (c) automatic min-max approach.
Item modeling. Using the item-modeling approach, the researcher begins by
selecting existing items from an operational measure. These parent items, also known as
item models (Bejar, 2002), have radical features that can then be systematically varied to
produce isomorphic iterations o f the item. Due to their similarity to the parent item, the
items created from this process are known as item clones (Glas & Van der Linden, 2003).
Likewise, the item cloning process can be used to generate item sets or families o f items
that look different from one another, but are generated by the same combinations o f
radicals (Geerlings et al., 2011), resulting in item families that share similar psychometric
characteristics. In theory, the newly created items would not need to be calibrated since
their parameters can be drawn from known family distributions (Geerlings et al., 2011).
Item modeling has been successfully used by ETS to supplement existing item pools. For
example, Bejar (2002) developed a measure o f quantitative ability through AIG item
modeling methodology in which the researchers examined an existing pool o f GRE
quantitative items, choosing a subset o f which to create item models.
The benefit o f such an approach is that a test taker cannot simply memorize or
solve the item by remembering an earlier solution (Gierl et al., 2015). For instance, a
series o f geometry items requiring the test taker to find the area o f a rectangle could be
created by simply changing the length o f each side. Likewise, as indicated by Drasgow,
Luecht, & Bennett (2006), item modeling, or the weak theory o f item modeling, is well
suited for a wide variety o f content domains where few theoretical descriptions of the
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cognitive skills required in solving problems exist or unique item types are required.
However, a drawback to this practice is that a large percentage o f the items generated
must be eliminated due to insufficient psychometric characteristics. Likewise, a relatively
limited number of psychometrically distinct items can be created through the item
modeling process. Since cloned items are vulnerable to the effects o f test coaching
(Morley, Bridgeman, & Lawless, 2004), and the ease with which examinees are able to
recognize such items, the practice o f item modeling is viewed negatively and regarded as
overly simplistic (Gierl et al., 2015).
Cognitive design system approach. A more advanced approach to AIG relies on
cognitive theory to guide item model construction. This strong theory o f item model
development (Irvine, 2002) begins with the examination and specification o f the radicals
that can be systematically varied on the basis o f a cognitive model. As such, the level o f
difficulty resulting from the use o f radicals can be predicted and subsequently tested to
evaluate the contribution that the radical has to the prediction o f item difficulties and to
verify the use o f the cognitive model. Subsequently, new item models are constructed to
overcome the limitations exhibited by the current measure and the validity o f the newly
created item model is reexamined (Embretson, 2005). The use o f cognitive theory and
associated cognitive processes to guide decisions regarding which radicals will be
manipulated as part o f the item model is what differentiates this method from the weak
theory item modeling approach.
The primary benefit o f using a strong theoretical approach is the reduced need for
extensive pilot testing since the factors that govern item difficulty can be specified,
modeled, and controlled, allowing for the prediction o f item difficulty (Gierl & Lai,
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2012). Likewise, through the structured use o f a cognitive model, item generation is
enhanced through established empirical studies o f cognitive functioning and
individual-differences research. However, in practical applications, a considerable
number of the items generated through the cognitive system design approach must be
removed due to insufficient psychometric characteristics (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012).
This issue is compounded due to the lack o f available cognitive theories to guide item
model development (Lai, Alves, & Gierl, 2009), limiting the use o f the cognitive design
system approach to narrow content domains such as mental rotation (Bejar, 1990) and
abstract reasoning (Embretson, 2002). As such, similar to item modeling, researchers
often resort to selecting items from existing measures to use as item models and
constructing additional items that do not interfere with the other items, further restricting
the number and quality o f the items that can be generated (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012).
Automatic min-max approach. In order to overcome the limitations and loss o f
items resulting from insufficient psychometric characteristics associated with the item
modeling and cognitive design system approaches, the automatic min-max approach was
developed as a more sophisticated method o f AIG which builds construct relatedness
directly into the item construction process (Arendasy et al., 2008; Arendasy & Sommer,
2012). Compared to the cognitive design approach, the cognitive model specified in the
automatic min-max approach initially covers a greater range o f possible item formats,
opening the possibly o f a variety o f innovative item types to tap the latent construct. As
argued by Drasgow et al., (2006), AIG item modeling should be guided by the same
design principles that are used in traditional test development (e.g., Downing &
Haladyna, 2006). For example, the first step in traditional scale development is the clear
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statement o f the latent construct that is intended to be measured from which future items
can be written (Hinkin, 1998). Likewise, the first step in producing an item model
through the top-down automatic min-max approach is a clear statement o f the latent
construct being measured along with the specification o f the cognitive model that details
the relevant knowledge, cognitive processes, and solution strategies that characterize the
latent trait. Based on the cognitive model, the researcher then selects an item format to
measure the latent trait. The cognitive model is then reduced to a more specific cognitive
item model. This reduced model specifies the radicals that are thought to trigger the
cognitive processes required to solve the item. Additionally, functional constraints are
specified to omit specific item radicals and incidentals that may interfere with the
cognitive processes o f interest. As such, the automatic min-max approach is
differentiated from the cognitive design approach through the use o f a quality control
mechanism and has been used to successfully generate algebra problems (Arendasy &
Sommer, 2007), figural matrices (Arendasy & Sommer, 2005), mental rotation (Arendasy
& Sommer, 2010), number series (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012), and English and German
word-fluency (Arendasy, Sommer, & Mayr, 2012) items with little to no loss in items due
to insufficient psychometric characteristics.
Procedural Framework of the Automatic Generation of
Analogical Reasoning Problems
As detailed by Arendasy and Sommer (2012), the automatic min-max approach to
AIG-model development includes the specification o f the latent trait under consideration;
choice o f item format; specification o f the cognitive model; and specification o f the
radicals, functional constraints, and incidentals. Likewise, items o f the type discussed in
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the following section require the generation o f alternative answer choices. This section
describes the procedural framework o f item model construction for the experimental AIG
measure used in this study.
Definition of the Latent Trait
Previous research has indicated that G f is closely related to g and is characterized
by the ability to solve novel problems and adapt to new situations (Cattell, 1957, 1971;
Gustafsson, 1984, 1989, 2001; Schneider & McGrew, 2012). Measures that best capture
G f are relatively culture-free, non-verbal, spatial measures o f inductive reasoning
(Carroll, 2003; Sattler, 2001). To clarify, inductive reasoning is the ability to identify
trends or patterns and extrapolate this information to reach a logical conclusion (Raven,
1938). In contrast, deductive reasoning is the ability to apply one or more given rules to
obtain a solution (Shye, 1988). Therefore, inductive reasoning entails the discovery of
relationships while deductive reasoning does not. As modeled by Spearman (1938),
inductive-reasoning items are solved by examining the elements o f a problem,
determining the logical relationships between them, and extrapolating these relationships
to other elements. As such, the abilities associated with inductive reasoning are typically
measured by tests consisting o f analogies, classifications, matrices, and series (Goldman
& Pellegrino, 1984; Sternberg & Gardner, 1983; van de Vijver, 1991).
Choice of the Item Format
In order to capture the latent trait and capitalize on AIG methodology, the
researcher chose a unique analogical item type. Analogical reasoning is the ability to
draw relationships between objects in one context and use this information to explain the
same relationship in another context (French, 2002; Holyoak, 2005). As such, the
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substantial cognitive component o f tasks such as these is the integration o f multiple
complex relationships (Robin & Holyoak, 1995). Closely related to Raven’s-type tasks
(Snow, Kyllonen, & Marshalek, 1984), analogical reasoning items require the examinee
to describe, generalize, or explain new phenomena based on familiar concepts, and serves
as a basis for dealing with novelty. Thus, the ability to reason through analogy is critical
for everyday situations and is closely linked to G/'(Duncan et al., 2000; Holyoak &
Morrison, 2005; Prabhakaran, Smith, Desmond, Glover, & Gabrieli, 1997).
In the current study, the experimental AIG measure o f G f was assessed through
the use o f analogical reasoning number sets (See Figure 1). The choice o f the item type
was not taken lightly. In order to create a measure as devoid o f cultural influences as
possible, numbers were chosen as a medium due to their near universal use (Porter,
1995). While numbers are used to represent values or quantities, it can be argued that
other symbols (e.g., letters, arrows, shapes) may impart unintended representations
depending on the cultural lens from which they are viewed (Bradley, 2010). As compared
to other symbols, numbers provide a means to assess examinee G f abilities through
symbols that are familiar to most cultures.
In the experimental AIG measure, examinees were presented with a series of
automatically-generated number sets consisting o f three numbers in an A:B::C:D (A is to
B as C is to D) sequence. Specifically, a randomly generated number set is presented in
Term A. In Term B, the number set is transformed according to one or more “rules.” The
examinee’s task is to identify the rule(s) that govern the number set transformation from
Term A to Term B. The examinee is then asked to apply the previously identified rule(s)
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to another randomly generated number set in Term C to obtain the number set that would
occupy Term D from three multiple-choice alternatives.

1011 1 2 : 1 3 1 4 1 5
!

( 1 2 1 4 1 6 : _________ |

i

1 7 1 8 19
18 20 22
161412

Figure 1. Sample Experimental AIG Measure Item

Specification of the Cognitive Item Model
The cognitive processes that are involved in solving analogical reasoning items
can be arranged into a series o f stages (Evans, 1968; Mulholland, Pellegrino, & Glaser,
1980; Sternberg, 1977). Although various models and terms have been used to describe
the cognitive processes associated with answering analogical reasoning items
(Mulholland et al., 1980), Sternberg’s (1977), cognitive process and naming conventions
are used below. In the first stage, Encoding, a mental representation o f the individual
terms o f the analogy are created, allowing further mental operations to be performed. In
the second stage, Inferring, the relationship between the corresponding attributes o f first
two terms (A - B) is inferred and stored in working memory. In the third stage, Mapping,
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the relationship between the first and third terms (A and C) is discovered and, likewise, is
stored in working memory. In the fourth stage, Application, the relationships discovered
in the Inferring and Mapping stages are used to identify the correct answer for the fourth
term (D). In an optional stage, Justification, particularly used in answering True-False
analogical reasoning items (e.g., Mulholland et al., 1980), the previous stages are checked
to determine if an error is made or to determine if additional information is required to
answer the question. In the final stage, Response, an answer is physically selected or
marked on an answer sheet from response alternatives.
Specification of Radicals, Functional
Constraints, and Incidentals
The automatic min-max approach to AIG item model development requires the
formal specification o f the radicals, functional constraints, and incidentals that promote
content representation within the items generated (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012). Each o f
these elements is described in this section.
Radicals. As previously described, radicals define the processes or actions
required to answer items. As such, radicals relate to the difficulty o f the items generated.
Primi (2001) describes the complexity factors that influence the difficulty o f G /item s.
These complexity factors are analogous to item radicals in AIG methodology. Primi
details four complexity factors: the number o f elements, the number o f rules, the types o f
rules, and the perceptual organization o f items. The “number o f elements” refers to the
number o f attributes contained in an item, while the “number o f rules” refers to the
number o f radical elements that are invoked by a given item. Both o f these factors are
associated with the cognitive load that is placed on the operational capacity o f working
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memory (Mulholland et al., 1980; Salthouse, 1994). As noted by Carpenter, Just, and
Shell (1990), participants completing matrices items decompose the items into smaller
sub-goals, requiring participants to track an increased number o f elements in order to
satisfy higher goals. Thus, as additional attributes and rules are applied to items, strain is
placed on the limited capacity o f working memory. The “types o f rules” refers to the
complexity of the content that is applied to the item attributes. For example, Jacobs and
Vandeventer (1972) created a taxonomy o f the transformations that can be used to
manipulate figural matrices items. These transformations range from simple rules (e.g.,
changes in object size) to complex transformations (e.g., adding matrices attribute) that
influence item difficulty. However, as noted by the authors, in practice, matrices items do
not cover the content domain well in that certain transformations tend to be
overrepresented or oversampled. Finally, “perceptual organization” refers to the visual
complexity or esthetics o f the items. As described by Primi (2001), “visually harmonious
items display perceptual and conceptual combinations that represent congruent
relationships between elements, whereas nonharmonic items tend to portray competitive
or conflicting combinations between visual and conceptual aspects that must be dealt
with in reaching a solution" (p. 51). For example, Carpenter et al. (1990) noted that
misleading cues such as superposed elements in matrices items increase item complexity.
Likewise, Primi (2001) demonstrated that over 50% o f the variance in item complexity is
accounted for by perceptual organization.
N um ber o f elements. The experimental AIG measure was designed to allow for
the lengths o f the number sets used to be variable. However, for practical purposes, the
number sets in the current study were restricted to three numbers. Since the number o f
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elements included in each item is consistent, the length o f the number sets is not expected
to exert a cognitive load on examinees.
N um ber o f rules. The number sets used in the experimental AIG measure were
generated according to a set of rules described in the next section. Since it is possible to
generate items that result from the application o f one or more rules, additional cognitive
load is expected to be exerted as additional rules are applied to the analogical numbers
sets.
Type o f rules. The type o f rule applied to the number sets should also influence
item difficulty. In order to link and manipulate the terms o f the experimental AIG
measure, mathematical operations were applied to the number sets. Namely, consistent
mathematical operations and mixed mathematical operations were used as radicals.
Consistent mathematical operations included problems in which the examinee was
presented with a randomly generated number and then addition was applied to obtain the
second number in the sequence; the third number was then obtained by again applying
addition to the second number (e.g., 1 5 - 1 6 - 1 7 : 2 2 - 2 3 - 24). The same consistent
mathematical operation applied if subtraction was used to obtain the second number from
the first, and the third from the second. Conversely, mixed mathematical operations
consisted o f items in which addition (or subtraction) was applied to the first number to
obtain the second, and then the opposite mathematical operation subtraction (or addition)
was applied to the second number to obtain the third (e.g., 14 - 16 - 12 : 20 - 22 - 18).
Likewise, numbers within the number series could duplicate. As such, the duplication o f
numbers will also be used as a radical.
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Perceptual organization. As noted by Primi (2001), the perceptual organization
o f item stimuli substantially impacts item difficulty. As such, the visual complexity o f the
automatically-generated number sets is expected to influence the overall difficulty o f the
items. For example, number sets that maintain the same perceptual organization across
terms (e.g., 7 - 8 - 9 : 12 - 13 - 14) are expected to be less difficult than items in which
the perceptual organization o f the items is flipped between terms (e.g., 5 - 6 - 7 : 1 4 - 1 3
- 12). As such, the visual dissimilarly o f the numbers within a number sets should
influence item difficulty.
Functional constraints. Functional constraints are specified to minimize the
influence o f unintended cognitive processes in solving AIG items. The goal o f functional
constrains is to enhance the construct relatedness o f the AIG items created such that the
abilities other than that o f the construct o f interest are removed from the item model. As
such, the AIG items created conform more closely to the intended construct.
Based on the item type and cognitive model, the constraints placed on the AIG
item model can take many forms. For instance, the random numbers contained in the
number sets will be constrained to two digits (10-30) to control the cognitive complexity
o f the items generated (Horn & Noll, 1997). Likewise, ambiguous items that permit more
than one solution should be prohibited (Scharroo & Leeuwenberg, 2000). That is, it is
conceivable that AIG items could be generated in which a correct solution and a
distractor number series are identical. In this case, a comparison can be made between
answer choice alternatives. If two answers are identical, another item can be generated.
Similarly, studies o f analogical reasoning tasks demonstrate the effect o f stimulus
priming on task performance (Blanchette & Dunbar, 2002; Spellman, Holyoak, &
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Morrison, 2001; Wharton, Holyoak, & Lange, 1996). Therefore, the radicals presented to
the test takers should be randomized to mitigate the effects o f pre-exposure o f identical
radicals.
Incidentals. Incidentals are designed to create variation in item appearances, but
have no effect on item difficulty. In the current study, item variation is achieved by
randomly generating numbers to populate the number sets.
Distractor Generation
As in traditional test development, AIG item difficulty is dependent on producing
distractors that are plausible enough to be endorsed (Doebler, 2015; Downing &
Yudkowsky, 2009). For example, in developing a static multiple-choice measure,
incorrect options that are endorsed by at least 5% percent o f test takers are considered
“functional distractors” while response options that are endorsed to a lesser degree add
little value to a measure (Downing & Yudkowsky, 2009). In AIG, algorithms are used to
create distractors (Gierl et al., 2012). However, simplistic strategies such as randomly
selecting items from the universe o f options will result in items that are too easy since the
correct option is easily identified (Doebler, 2015). Rather, the psychometric soundness of
AIG measures can be improved by systematically switching or removing the radicals or
combinations o f radicals that were used to generate the item stem (Arendasy & Sommer,
2005; Doebler, 2015). For example, if the numbers in Term C are linked by adding 2, a
distractor item may fail to add 2 or add a number other than 2 to generate an incorrect
option for Term D. As such, controlled variation is produced in the response options,
masking the correct answer and improving the measurement o f the construct o f interest.
While the procedures just mentioned represent the current best practices in AIG, the
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effects that distractors have on the psychometric properties o f items is difficult to
ascertain and is an under represented area o f researcher (Gierl et al., 2012).
Formulation of the Problem
The purpose o f the current research is to build on the existing AIG
methodological framework through the construction and validation of an on-the-fly
measure o f cognitive ability that is generated at the time o f item presentation. In order to
fulfill this purpose, the proposed measure will be developed using the automatic min-max
approach (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012). Next, the psychometric characteristics and the
nomological network of the experimental AIG measure will be examined. The general
expectations are that the proposed measure will demonstrate unidimensionality and
construct relatedness and will correlate with other measures o f G f
A fundamental concern in the development o f a psychological instrument is the
establishment of the unidimensionality o f the measure. Dimensionality refers to the
number o f latent traits that contribute to responding to the items o f an instrument
(DeVellis, 2012). Commonly, the dimensionality o f psychometric instruments is
evaluated through the use o f exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. However, as
recommended by Arendasy and Sommer (2012), the unidimensionality o f AIG measures
can be assessed through the use o f the Rasch model as a prerequisite for testing the
constructed relatedness o f AIG items. The fit o f the data to the Rasch is examined
through the use o f likelihood ratio tests (e.g., Andersen, 1973; Martin-Lof, 1973), which
relate the likelihood o f the item parameter data to a null model. If the tests fail to reach
significance, then the hypothesis that the experimental AIG measure demonstrates Rasch
model fit can be retained. As such, Hypothesis 1 concerns the dimensionality o f the
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experimental AIG measure. It is expected that the experimental AIG measure will display
unidimensionality.
Hypothesis 1: The experimental AIG measure will display unidimensionality.
Construct representation (Embretson, 1983) concerns the identification o f the
theoretical operations that contribute to performance on a measure. For AIG measures,
the construct representativeness o f a measure is determined by examining the effects that
the specified item radicals contribute to item difficulty (Embretson & Daniel, 2008;
Freund et al., 2008; Gierl & Haladyna, 2012; Poinstingl, 2009). As such, construct
representation provides evidence supporting the inclusion o f the item radicals in the item
model since these elements are hypothesized to affect item difficulty. Thus, initial
evidence for the construct representation o f the experimental AIG measure is established
through the examination o f these features (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012). The ultimate
goal is to produce a model that accounts for as much item difficulty as possible, based on
the features of the item model (Gierl & Haladyna, 2012). As such, Hypothesis 2 concerns
the content representation o f the experimental AIG measure. It is expected that the item
radicals specified will predict item difficulty.
Hypothesis 2: The experimental AIG measure will display satisfactory construct
representation.
Hypothesis 2a: Consistent Mathematical Operations will significantly predict
item difficulty.
Hypothesis 2b: Mixed Mathematical Operations will significantly predict item
difficulty.
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Hypothesis 2c: Duplicate Numbers will significantly predict item difficulty.
Hypothesis 2d: Flipped Relationships will significantly predict item difficulty.
In traditional test-development applications, test-retest reliability is commonly
used to demonstrate the stability o f test scores across administrations (Anastasi & Urbina,
1997). As noted by Shuttleworth (2009), measures o f cognitive ability are good
candidates for such analyses because it is unlikely that participant ability level will
suddenly change. Thus, it is expected that participants will obtain similar scores across
test administrations. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 concerns the temporal stability o f the
experimental AGI measure.
Hypothesis 3: The experimental AIG measure will show adequate test-retest
reliability.
Another method used to demonstrate the validity o f a measure is to examine its
nomological network (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). As described by Campbell and Fiske
(1959), convergent validity provides an indication that a measure shares a substantial
relationship to other measures to which it should be theoretically related. As noted
previously, non-verbal and culture-free measures o f inductive reasoning best capture G f
(Carroll, 2003; Sattler, 2001). As conceived by Thurstone, tasks such as Letter Sets and
Number Series tap inductive reasoning abilities well (Freedheim & Weiner, 2003). When
subjected to confirmatory factor analysis, along with matrices measures, a substantial G f
factor is formed by Letter Sets and Number Series tasks (Hicks et al., 2015). The purpose
o f this series o f analysis is to examine the criterion relatedness o f the experimental AIG
measure. As such, Hypotheses 4a and 4b concern the predictive relationship shared
between the experimental AIG measure and established measures o f cognitive ability. It
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is expected that the experimental AIG measure o f G f will correlate with other measures
o f Gf.
However, G f is also known to share a relationship with demographic variables.
For instance, previous research indicates that G f tends to decrease with age (Cattell,
1943). Therefore, Hypothesis 4c concerns the predictive relationship shared between the
experimental AIG measure and examinee age. It is expected that the experimental AIG
measure o f G f will correlate negatively with examinee age.
Hypothesis 4: The experimental AIG measure will demonstrate satisfactory
criterion validity.
Hypothesis 4a: The experimental AIG measure will significantly predict scores
on the Letter Sets task.
Hypothesis 4b: The experimental AIG measure will significantly predict scores
on the Number Series task.
Hypothesis 4c: The experimental AIG measure will demonstrate a significant
negative relationship with examinee age.
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CHAPTER 2

DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPERIMENTAL AIG MEASURE

The development o f the experimental AIG measure began with a content analysis.
The purpose o f the content analysis was to identify the item radicals, incidentals, and
functional constraints that could be manipulated and controlled. Four content specialists
who hold advanced degrees in psychological sciences served as subject matter experts
(SMEs) in this analysis. SMEs were provided with a definition o f the latent trait, the
cognitive model, and a prototypical item model. SMEs were then asked to examine the
item model and verbally describe the process an examinee would take to solve a given
item. Likewise, SMEs were asked to indicate the various elements of the item model that
could be varied in order to trigger the appropriate solution strategy. Using the information
provided by the SMEs, radicals, incidentals, and functional constraints were specified.
Generative Matrix
Based on the information obtained from the content analysis, the experimental
AIG measure was created using the PHP programing language, a popular open source
server-side scripting language (PHP.net, 2016). In order to generate the analogical
reasoning items, first, a randomly-generated base number was produced for each o f the
four analogical reasoning terms (A through D) and multiple-choice alternatives. Base
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number values were constrained to numbers between 10 and 30 in order to reduce the
cognitive load associated with interpreting number values greater than two digits in
length and to add perceptual uniformity to the look o f AIG items. Likewise, this
constraint served to eliminate the possibility o f negative values. These randomlygenerated numbers were intended to serve as incidental elements, creating variation in
how the items look without affecting difficulty. Next, term manipulation numbers were
randomly generated for use in subsequent mathematical manipulations. These term
manipulation numbers were used to create patterns in the analogical reasoning terms.
Term manipulation numbers were constrained to values between 1 and 4 in order to limit
the cognitive load associated with adding and subtracting numbers o f lower or higher
values. The term manipulation values o f Terms A and B were identical as were the values
for Terms C and D. For instance, if the number 4 was generated to manipulate Term A, 4
was also used to manipulate Term B. Likewise, if the number 3 was generated to
manipulate Term C, 3 was also used to manipulate Term D.
Next, mathematical and logical manipulations were applied to the base numbers
using the term manipulation numbers as controlled by an item generation matrix. The
item generation matrix consisted o f 14 variables (See Table 1) dictating item and
distractor construction. The leftmost column represents the item being generated. The 14
columns to the right (labeled 1 through 14) represent the variables manipulated to
generate the items. In the table, each variable is listed below the aspect o f the item that is
controlled. Further clarification on how the items are generated is presented in the
following paragraphs.

The mathematical manipulation between the first and second value o f each term
was controlled by Variable 1. Variable 1 could take one o f three values (1 = subtraction;
2 = addition; 3 = duplicate). For example, suppose the base number for Term A was 10
with a term manipulation number o f 3. The value o f Variable 1 dictates if 3 is added or
subtracted from 10. If Variable 1 had a value o f 2, 3 was added to 10 to generate the
second value (13) in Term A. Likewise, if the value o f Variable 1 was /, then 3 would be
subtracted from 10 to generate the second value (7) in Term A. However, if instead the
value o f Variable 1 was 3, then the term manipulation number (3) would be ignored and
10 would be a duplicated value (10). Variable 2 acted in the same manner, controlling the
relationship between the second and third number in the term.
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Table 1. Item Generation Matrix
Item
FL FR
Disl
Gen
1 2

3

4

5

1

1

1

1

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

1 2
1 3
2 1
2 2
2 3
3 1
3 2
1 1
1 2
2 1
2 2
3 1
3 2
1 2
2 1
3 1
3 2
1 2
2 1
3 1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1 1
1 2
1 3

1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Item

9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

2
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
2
3
3
1
2
3
3
1
2
3

6

1
2
3
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1

Dis2

Dis3

FD1

FD2

FD3

#Ds

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

2 2
2 1
3 1
1 2
1 1
3 2
1 3
2 3
2 2
2 1
1 2
1 1
1 3
2 3
2 1
1 2
1 3
2 3
2 1
1 2
1 3

1

2

1

1

2

1
2
2
2

3
1
2
3
1
2
1
2

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

2
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
1

2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

7

3
3
1
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
2
3
1
1
2
3

3
2
3
2
1
3
2
2
1
3
2
2

22
2
2
1 1
2
2
1
3 2
3 2
2 3
2
Note. Item Gen = item generation; FL = flip left; FR = flip right; D isl = distractor 1; Dis
2 = distractor 2; Dis3 = distractor 3; FD1 = flip distractor 1; FD2 = flip distractor 2; FD3
= flip distractor 3; #Ds = number o f distractors.

In addition to Variables 1 and 2 that generate differentiation in the pattern o f
numbers in each term, Variables 3 and 4 were used to influence the perceptual
complexity o f analogical reasoning items. These variables allowed for the pattern created
by Variables 1 and 2 to be “flipped,” expanding the construct space, requiring the test
taker to examine and draw relationships across item terms. For example, a term

77

consisting of the numbers 1 5 - 1 6 - 1 7 could be inverted to 17 - 16 - 15 if indicated by
Variables 3 or 4. Variables 3 and 4 could take one o f two values (1 = no flip; 2 = flip)
with Variable 3 controlling Terms A and C and Variable 4 controlling Terms B and D.
The remaining variables in the item matrix were used to generate item distractors.
Variables 5 through 10 are analogous to Variables 1 and 2, controlling the generation o f
the pattern o f numbers that comprise the three distractor terms. Variables 5 and 6
controlled Distractor 1; Variables 7 and 8 controlled Distractor 2; and Variables 9 and 10
controlled Distractor 3. The patterns o f variable values were systematically manipulated
to create plausible distractor choices. For example, if Variables 1 and 2 contained values
o f 1 and 2 respectively, Variables 5 and 6 may consist o f values 1 and 2, 2 and 7, 7 and 7,
or 2 and 2. Additional variation in distractor items was produced by systematically
manipulating the term manipulation number. For example, if the term manipulation
number was 3, distractor items may contain values surrounding this value (e.g., 1,2, or
4). Variables 11, 12, and 13 are analogous to Variables 3 and 4 controlling the “flip” o f
the terms in Distractors 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Thus, the “flip” variables applied to the
distractors allow for additional variation and further mask the identification o f the correct
answer. Additionally, constraints were placed on distractor terms eliminating the
possibility that a distractor matched the correct answer. Finally, Variable 14 was used to
indicate the number o f distractors to generate. Variable 14 could take on values o f 1, 2, or
3 indicating how many distractors to generate. In the current study, this variable was held
constant at 2, allowing for the presentation o f only two distractors and a correct answer.
However, future research may examine the effects o f greater or fewer distractors.
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The values of the 14 variables in the item generation matrix were counterbalanced
to create uniform variation and broad construct coverage in the 22 AIG analogical
reasoning item families and the multiple-choice distractors. Moreover, since item
generation was controlled using an item matrix, precise information about how the items
were constructed allowed for the precise testing o f the radicals and incidental involved.
A 22-item measure comprised o f the items generated from the item generation
matrix was administered online along with a demographic form which asked basic
information including age, gender, ethnicity, and educational attainment. Consistent with
scale development best practices (DeVellis, 2012; Freund & Holling, 2011), a
demonstration o f the rules (i.e., radicals) that were used to manipulate analogical
reasoning terms was presented via an instructional video. Additionally, written
instructions were made available to participants. As noted by Freund et al. (2008), tests o f
inductive reasoning frequently suffer from a lack o f clarity regarding the types o f tasks
that are involved in solving items. For instance, the rules that govern the relationship
between corresponding analogical reasoning terms must be discovered before the
relationship discovered can be extrapolated (Sternberg, 1977). However, with no
additional information, it is plausible that test takers may disagree on the rules that
govern the relationship between terms. Thus, unintended rules may be applied to items
that allow a test taker to reach a solution that is quite different from the “correct”
solution. In order to avoid this issue, test takers can be presented information regarding
the various rules that govern the relationship between analogy terms prior to test
administration.
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In addition to clarifying the task, test fairness and accuracy o f the measure is
increased since no participant is unfairly disadvantaged by misunderstanding the patterns
imbedded in the items (Freund et al., 2008). As such, before the measure is administered,
practice items were made available to participants, allowing them to become familiar
with the task and item format that was used. Participants were allowed to complete as
many practice items as they wished without time constraints. During the practice session,
participants were provided feedback regarding the correctness o f each response.
After completing the practice session, the presentation o f the item radicals used to
generate the 22-item experimental measure was randomized to control for order effects.
Once participants selected a response, they were not able to return to the previous item.
In order to reduce examinee fatigue and to limit the amount o f time taken to
complete the experimental AIG measure, a pilot study was conducted to determine the
amount o f time provided to answer each item. Participants (N = 4) were asked to answer
the items o f the experimental AIG measure as quickly as possible. The mean response
time was 16.51 seconds (SD = 8.45). As a result o f the pilot study, a 30-second time limit
was established for examinees to answer each item.
Scoring
Raw scores for the experimental AIG measure were calculated using the
following scheme. First, the average response time for items that were answered correctly
was calculated from the total sample (M = 15.06 seconds). Due to its approximation o f
the midpoint o f the time allowed to answer the items, this figure was rounded down to
15.00 seconds, and this served as a benchmark value. Next, a score o f 1 was awarded to
participants who answered the item correctly and submitted their response prior to the
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benchmark value. A 0 was awarded for items that were either answered incorrectly and/or
elicited a response after the benchmark value. Since the experimental AIG measure
contained 22 items, scores could range from 0 to 22.
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY 1

CONTENT VALIDATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The purpose o f the current research is to build on the existing AIG
methodological framework through the construction and validation o f an on-the-fly
measure o f cognitive ability that is generated at the time o f item presentation. In order to
accomplish the aims o f the research, three studies were conducted examining the
construct representation, temporal stability, and criterion relatedness o f the scores
produced by the experimental AIG measure. The aim o f Study 1 is to assess Hypotheses
1 and 2 relating to the unidimensionality and construct representation o f the experimental
AIG measure.
Participants
The sample consisted o f 333 respondents (193 male and 140 female) from the
United States between the ages o f 18 and 81 (M = 35.3; SD = 13.8). Guidelines for
traditional scale development suggest that a sample o f approximately 300 participants is
required to ensure the stability of the findings (Nunnally, 1978). Likewise, Downing
(2003) indicates that a sample o f at least 200 participants is required to assess Rasch
model fit. As such, the size o f the sample in the current study seems adequate.
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The majority o f the participants (80.8%) were recruited through Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (mTurk). mTurk has become a popular crowdsourcing platform from
which behavioral science researchers may solicit research participants (Chandler,
Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014; Krupnikov & Levine, 2014). Previous research has indicated
that the results obtained from mTurk workers are comparable to conventional sources of
data collection such as convenience and snowball sampling (Buhrmester, Kwang, &
Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). Likewise, previous scale-development
initiatives have sourced mTurk workers as participants, producing scales with acceptable
psychometric characteristic (Buhrmester, et al., 2011). The remaining participants
(19.2%) were recruited via snowball sampling through social media. In exchange for their
participation, participants sourced from mTurk were provided monetary compensation.
Prior to data collection, a pilot study was conducted to estimate the average amount o f
time required to complete the experimental AIG measure. mTurk workers were
compensated according to this time estimate and to the median minimum wage for the
United States to ensure fair wage compensation. All participants were provided feedback
regarding their performance on the AIG measure (number o f items answered correctly).
O f the sample, 76.6 % identified as White/Caucasian, 9.3% as African-American,
6.9% as Hispanic-American, 2.1% as Asian-American, 0.6% as American-Indian, and
8.4% as other. The reported educational attainment levels were as follows: 0.3% some
school, no high school diploma; 13.2% high school diploma or equivalent; 18.9% some
college credit; no degree; 3.9% trade/technical/vocational training; 10.8% Associate
degree; 36.9% Bachelor’s degree; 11.1% M aster’s degree; 1.5% Professional degree;

83

2.7% Doctorate degree. The average time spent working on the test was 8:31 minutes (SD
= 3:18 minutes) ranging between 2:21 and 25:27 minutes.
Procedure
Study data were collected via an online measure hosted by the researcher. In order
to access the scale, participants were provided a link to the experimental AIG measure.
Before beginning the measure, participants were presented with an informed-consent
form stating the purpose o f the project, instruments involved, risks and alternative
treatments, compensation (if any), and the contact information o f the researcher. The
letter of approval from the Louisiana Tech University institutional review board (IRB) is
presented in the appendix. Participants were then asked to provide basic demographic
information (age, gender, race, and educational attainment). Participants were instructed
to answer items as quickly as possible and were given the opportunity to complete as
many practice items as they wished. Practice items were administered without time
limitations, and feedback regarding the correctness o f responses was provided after an
answer was selected. Once comfortable with the task, participants could advance to the
actual experimental AIG measure. Participants were provided 30 seconds in which to
respond to each item. If an answer was not submitted in less than 30 seconds, participants
were automatically advanced to the next question. No feedback was given regarding the
correctness o f items in the non-practice portion o f the measure.
Results
Analyses were conducted using SAS 9.1, SPSS 17.0 (descriptive and correlational
values), and RStudio (LLTM analysis). Prior to performing the analyses, item responses
that were submitted in less than one second were recoded as missing data. These suspect
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responses were likely the result o f participants inadvertently double clicking the response
button to the previous question. Since the presentation o f the items was randomized,
these suspect items can be classified as missing completely at random (Little & Rubin,
2002). Maximum likelihood estimation was used to impute the missing data points.
Previous research has indicated that maximum likelihood estimation is advantageous to
other methods of handling missing data including listwise and pairwise deletion, as well
as mean imputation techniques (Baraldi & Enders, 2010; Newman, 2003). O f the total
sample, 70 o f the cases required the imputation o f one or more items. Subsequent
analysis o f imputed and non-imputed cases revealed that the scores o f these measures
correlated highly (r = .99). On average, participants answered 17.15 (SD = 4.30) o f the 22
items correctly within the 30 seconds provided for each item. However, once the item
scoring algorithm was applied, the mean score obtained on the measure was 9.20 (SD =
5.12). A one-sample Kolmogorov-Smimov (p - .001) and Shapiro-Wilk test (p < .001)
indicate that participant total score data were not normally distributed. However, after a
visual inspection o f a histogram plot (Figure 2), it was determined that the dataset
exhibited sufficient normality (Howell, 2013).
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Histogram

Mean =9.2
Std. Dev. =5.121
N =333

Score

Figure 2. Histogram o f Experimental AIG Scores

Previous research examining gender differences in G f reveal no systematic
differences (Colom & Garcia-Lopez, 2002). This is not to say that males and females
perform equally well on all G f tasks. For example, meta-analytic evidence indicates that
in adult samples, males tend to outperform females (d = .33) on tasks such as Raven’s
Advanced Progressive Matrices (Lynn & Irwing, 2004). In general, females tend to
outperform males on verbal tasks while males outperform females on spatial-ability
measures (Halpern, 1997; Neisser et al., 1996). Thus, when measures o f verbal,
reasoning, and spatial ability are combined to obtain broad ability estimates, gender gaps
are largely eliminated. However, as reported by Casey, Nuttall, Pezaris, and Benbow
(1995), males are particularly advantaged in mathematical-ability tasks. This difference is
principally seen at the upper end o f the ability continuum. In contrast, no gender
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differences in mathematical ability are seen in low-ability and average-ability samples.
As noted by Brody (1992), the difference in mathematical ability may be due to highly
developed visual-spatial skills in such high-ability males.
The experimental AIG measure tasks the examinee with quickly identifying
mathematical manipulations and drawing relationships across a visual-spatial field.
Therefore, one may expect to see differential scoring on such a measure. An independentsamples Mest was conducted to compare gender differences in scoring on the
experimental AIG measure. Results o f the analysis indicate a significant effect for
gender, /(326.11) = 3.69, p < .001, with men receiving higher scores than women.
Likewise, an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare score differences
between the mTurk and snowball samples. Results o f the analysis indicate a significant
sample effect, /(331) = -2.74, p = .007, with the mTurk sample receiving higher scores
than the snowball sample. For examinees who provided demographics, the scores
produced by male and females at six age intervals for the total, mTurk, and snowball
samples are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4 respectively. Likewise, the scores produced
by males and females by educational attainment are presented in Table 5.
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Table 2. Experimental AIG Measure Score Means and Standard Deviations
by Gender fo r Six Age Intervals.______________________________________
Age intervals
18-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70+
Total

n
63
75
24
15
7
6
190

Male
M
11.0
10.3
9.0
8.9
5.9
7.7
10.0

Female
SD
5.6
5.2
4.5
5.3
6.4
8.0
5.5

n
52
37
22
15
4
4
134

M
8.1
8.0
7.3
9.5
10.3
3.5
8.0

SD
3.9
5.1
3.7
4.4
7.9
1.3
4.4

Total Sample
n
M SD
115 9.7 5.1
112 9.6 5.2
8.2 4.2
46
30
9.2 4.8
11
7.5 6.9
10
6.0 6.4
324 9.2 5.2

Table 3. Experimental AIG Measure Score Means and Standard Deviations
by Gender for Six Age Intervals for the mTurk sample.___________________
Male
Age intervals
18-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70+
Total

n
59
65
22
15
2
2
165

M
11.0
10.3
9.1
8.9
14.0
16.5
10.4

Female
SD
5.8
5.2
4.7
5.3
5.7
.7
5.3

n
40
28
21
11
2
0
102

M
8.3
8.3
7.2
9.9
13.0
n/a
8.3

Total Sample
SD
4.0
5.2
3.8
4.8
9.9
n/a
4.5

n
99
93
43
26
4
2
267

M
9.9
9.7
8.2
9.3
13.5
16.5
9.6

SD
5.3
5.2
4.3
5.0
6.6
.7
5.1

Table 4. Experimental AIG Measure Score Means and Standard Deviations
by Gender fo r Six Age Intervals fo r the snowball sample.
Male
Age intervals
18-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
70+
Total

n
4
10
2
0
5
4
25

M
11.3
10.3
7.5
n/a
2.6
3.3
7.6

Total Sample

Female
SD
4.0
5.6
.7
n/a
2.6
5.3
5.7

n
12
9
1
4
2
4
32

M
7.7
7.0
8.0
8.5
7.5
3.5
7.1

SD
3.7
5.0
n/a
3.8
7.8
1.3
4.1

n
16
19
3
4
7
8
57

M
8.6
8.7
7.7
8.5
4.0
3.4
7.3

SD
3.9
5.4
.6
3.8
4.5
3.5
4.8
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Table 5. Experimental AIG Measure Score Means and Standard Deviations by
Gender fo r Eight Educational Attainments.
Female

Male
Educational attainment
High school grad
Some college
Trade/technical
Associate's degree
Bachelor's degree
Master's degree
Professional degree
Doctorate degree
Total

Total Sample

n
27
33
5
24
74

M
9.5
11.2
8.4
9.5
9.5

SD
5.0
5.8
4.7
5.5
5.6

n
17
30
8
12
49

M
7.1
7.4
5.6
8.7
8.4

SD
5.9
3.8
3.0
4.8
3.9

n
44
63
13
36
123

M
8.6
9.4
6.7
9.3
9.1

SD
5.4
5.2
3.8
5.3
5.0

18

10.4

4.2

19

9.9

4.6

37

10.2

4.3

4
6
191

12.8
11.3
10.0

5.1
6.8
5.4

1
3
139

4.0
4.0
8.0

n/a
4.4
4.4

5
9
330

11.0
8.9
9.1

5.9
6.9
5.1

Some classical test theory results. Using the precedent set by Doebler and
Holling (2015), classical test theory analyses commonly reported in scale development
research are presented here to aid in the interpretation o f the psychometric characteristics
o f the experimental AIG measure. These statistics are meant to provide the reader with a
more complete understanding o f how the measure is performing. In general, Cronbach
alpha values o f .70 or greater indicate acceptable internal consistency (Kline, 1999).
However, Kline also notes that cognitive ability measures should strive for alphas o f .80
or greater. The experimental AIG measure demonstrated adequate internal consistency (a
= .86; SEM = 1.91). Likewise, Nunnally and Bernstein (1994) suggest that item
discrimination values o f greater than .20 are sufficient while Anastasi and Urbina (1997)
propose that item difficulty values between .15 and .85 are acceptable. Item
discrimination values ranged from .34 to .52 (median = .43) while difficulty values
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ranged from .14 to .63 (median = .46) indicating that the item statistics largely conform to
recommended tolerances.
Linear Logistic Test Model (LLTM). The evaluation o f item radicals and
incidentals can be accomplished either through the LLTM (De Boeck & Wilson, 2004;
Fischer, 1973, 1995) or multiple regression analyses (Gorin & Embretson, 2006). In AIG
studies, the LLTM is more commonly employed since it provides a means to evaluate
cognitive models (Arendasy et al., 2008; Arendasy & Sommer, 2010, 2012; Arendasy et
al., 2012; Freund et ah, 2008). That is, LLTM allows for the empirical testing o f the
cognitive processes that contribute to item difficulty, thus demonstrating construct
validity o f the items generated from the item model (Fischer, 1973). Under the LLTM,
the difficulty parameter o f the Rasch model is reduced into a linear combination o f
radical effects, allowing for their contribution to the prediction o f item difficulty to be
assessed (Freund et ah, 2008; Holling, Bertling, & Zeuch, 2009). That is, the LLTM
assumes that the difficulty parameter o f the Rasch model is comprised o f several
cognitive operations that sum to the overall difficulty parameter estimate (Baghaei &
Kubinger, 2015). As such, there is no point in decomposing the difficulty parameter o f a
Rasch model that lacks fit, as the data produced would lack meaning (Fischer, 2005).
Therefore, assessing the fit of the Rasch model is prerequisite for applying the LLTM
(Fischer, 1973; Poinstingl, 2009).
The consistency o f the Rasch model can be assessed through likelihood ratio tests
determining the fit o f the data to the model. As noted by Rost (1982), the Rasch model
assumes both item and person homogeneity. As such, both forms o f homogeneity must be
tested. Tests o f item homogeneity determine if more than one person parameter is
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needed. Conversely, checking for person homogeneity entails determining if more than
one item parameter is needed for each item to describe the data.
The M artin-Lof (1973) test for unidimensionality is a likelihood ratio test used to
examine the fit o f the Rasch model by separating the items o f a measure into two groups
o f items. The item parameters o f these groups o f items are subsequently examined for
homogeneity (Mair, Hatzinger, & Maier, 2013). If the maximum likelihood values of
both sets o f items are approximately equal to the maximum likelihood calculated for both
sets o f items together, then the Rasch model holds, and it is assumed that both sets of
items tap the same dimensions (Verguts & De Boeck, 2000). Thus, non-significant values
indicate that Rasch model holds. The M artin-Lof results failed to reveal a significant
■y

difference (median raw score: % [120] = 82.36, p > .05).
The Andersen (1973) likelihood ratio test was also used to determine the fit o f the
data to the Rasch model. This test compares the item parameters o f two predefined
subgroups in the total sample to determine if differential item functioning is present as a
result o f the splitting criterion (Futschek, 2014). In AIG studies, median raw scores are
commonly used as the partitioning criterion (Freund et al., 2008; Arendasy & Sommer,
2012). If the likelihood ratio test fails to reach significance, then the fit o f the data to
Rasch model is retained and the LLTM can be estimated (Baghaei & Kubinger, 2015).
The results o f the Andersen test indicate that the data fit the Rasch model (median raw
score: %2 [21] = 24.79,/? > .05). As such, Hypothesis 1 concerning the unidimensionality
o f the AIG measure is supported.
Under the LLTM, item difficulty is calculated based on the weighted contribution
o f the item radicals through a design matrix, indicating the degree to which these
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elements are related to the cognitive complexity o f AIG items (Embretson & Daniel,
2008). As a result, the combined effects o f radicals can be used to account for the
difficulty parameter in the Rasch model, supporting the construct representation o f the
item model (Arendasy & Sommer, 2012). The hypothesized cognitive components that
are required to solve assessment items are entered as a Q-matrix. The Q-matrix used in
the current analysis is presented in Table 6. The columns o f the Q-matrix represent the
cognitive operations measured by the experimental AIG measure, and the column values
indicate the weights applied to each o f the cognitive process for each item. For instance,
the number series pattern in Item 1 (e.g., 1 0 - 8 - 6 : 1 7 - 1 5 - 1 3 ) consisted o f
subtraction between the first and second number, and subtraction between the second and
third number (Consistent Mathematical Operation). However, Item 2 (e.g., 10 - 8 - 12 :
1 7 - 1 5 - 1 9 ) consisted o f subtraction between the first and second number and addition
between the second and third numbers (Mixed Mathematical Operations). As such, the Qmatrix details the hypothetical cognitive components (i.e., radicals) that are thought to
influence item difficulty.

92

Table 6. Q-Matrix fo r the Experimental AIG Measure

Item
1
2
3

Consistent
Mathematical
Operations

Mixed
Mathematical
Operations

Duplicate
Numbers

Flipped
Relationship

1

0
1
0

0
0
1

0
0
0

1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0

0

0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1

0

1

0

0
0

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

0
1

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

21
22

0
0

0
0
0
1

0

Radical difficulties are assessed through an easiness parameter (i.e., eta). The
easiness parameters, standard errors, and 95% confidence intervals for each o f the four
hypothesized radicals in the LLTM analysis are presented in Table 7. Negative easiness
parameter values indicate cognitive operations that increase the difficulty o f items while
positive values indicate radicals that can reduce the difficulty o f items (Baghaei &
Kubinger, 2015). As such, the item radicals o f “Mixed Mathematical Operations” and
“Flipped Relationships” increase the difficulty o f items, while “Consistent Mathematical
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Operations” and “Duplicate Numbers” decrease the difficulty o f items. As suggested by
Baghaei and Kubinger (2015), if the confidence intervals that surround the easiness
parameters fail to include zero, the radical specified significantly contributes to item
difficulty. Radicals that fail to support the predicted relationship with item difficulty can
be excluded from the item generation process and the cognitive model can be redefined.
All radicals of the experimental AIG measure significantly predict item difficulty. As
such, Hypotheses 2a through 2d regarding the ability o f the radicals to significantly
predict item difficulty is supported.

Table 7. Parameter Estimates, Standard Error, and Confidence Intervals fo r the Item
Radicals o f the Experimental AIG Measure____________________________________
Parameter
Estimate
SE
Lower Cl Upper Cl
Consistent Mathematical Operations
0.171
0.500
0.166
0.834
Mixed Mathematical Operations
-1.050
0.133
-1.310
-0.790
Duplicate Numbers
0.550
0.177
0.204
0.896
Flipped Relationships
-0.703
0.058
-0.815
-0.590

Further demonstration o f the construct representation o f the LLTM analysis is
indicated by the correlation o f the empirically generated Rasch easiness parameters to
those predicted by the LLTM analysis. As indicated by Arendasy and Sommer (2013), R2
values o f .70 and greater are desirable. The empirically derived and predicted item
difficulty parameters o f the experimental AIG measure were highly correlated (r = .97).
Thus, the R2 value in this analysis was .93, indicating that 93% o f the variance in the
Rasch difficulty parameter could be accounted for by the cognitive model. The plot o f the
empirically derived and predicted item difficulty parameters is presented in Figure 3. As

94

such, Hypothesis 2 regarding the construct representation o f the radicals o f the
experimental AIG measure is supported.
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Figure 3. Plot o f Empirically and LLTM Generated Item Difficulty Parameter Estimates

Discussion
The purpose o f the current study was to understand the construct representation o f
an experimental AIG measure by assessing the influence o f the hypothesized cognitive
components on item difficulty. Conventional item analysis suggests that although the
items o f the AIG measure were generated from a random base number and the
presentation o f radicals was randomized, the measure demonstrates adequate internal
consistency (.86) for a measure o f mental abilities. Likewise, median item discrimination
(.43) and difficulty (.46) values produced are within established guidelines. From a
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classical test construction perspective, the items o f the experimental AIG measure are
well correlated, able to distinguish test taker performance, and o f appropriate difficulty.
The results o f Study 1 also show that it is possible to model the experimental AIG
measure data through Rasch and LLTM, allowing for an estimation o f the contribution of
the influence that radicals impart on item difficulty. According to the Martin-Lof and
Andersen tests, item and person homogeneity are present, supporting unidimensionality
o f the experimental AIG Measure and fit to the Rasch model.
Using LLTM, Mixed Mathematical Operations had the greatest impact on
increasing the difficulty o f items followed by Flipped Relationships. Presumably, each o f
these radicals placed a cognitive load on working memory reducing the likelihood of
obtaining a correct answer within the time allotted. In contrast, Consistent Mathematical
Operations and the inclusion o f a duplicate number within a term had the opposite effect,
lowering the difficulty o f the items generated. As such, this result provides evidence
supporting the inclusion o f the hypothesized item radicals in the item model since these
elements affect item difficulty. Likewise, the hypothesized cognitive model accounted for
a large portion (93%) of the variance in the Rasch difficulty parameter, producing results
that are similar to other LLTM investigations (e.g., Arendasy, 2000, 2005; Arendasy &
Sommer, 2005, 2007; Arendasy et al., 2007; Gittler, 1990; Gittler & Arendasy, 2003). As
such, the cognitive model specified demonstrates substantial coverage o f the processes
test takers use to obtain a correct response to the items o f the measure. Thus, the analyses
detailed in Study 1 support the assertion that experimental AIG measure demonstrates
adequate unidimensionality and construct representation.
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY 2

TEMPORAL STABILITY RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Study 2 was designed to assess the temporal stability o f the experimental AIG
measure across test administrations. Although this type o f analysis is not commonly
performed on on-the-fly AIG measures, test-retest correlations are commonly used in
classical test design to describe scale functioning. As such, this study is designed to
provide insights into the stability o f experimental AIG measure scores over time.
Participants
A subset o f Study 1 examinees elected to participate in Study 2. The sample
consisted o f 36 respondents (22 male and 14 female) from the United States between the
ages of 21 and 71 (M = 37.69; SD = 14.59). According to Field (2009), samples o f this
size (N > 30) are generally sufficient for research purposes. The majority o f the
participants were recruited through mTurk (77.8%). The remaining 22.2% of participants
were recruited via snowball sampling through social media. O f the sample, 66.7%
identified as White/Caucasian, 11.1 % as African-American, 8.3% as Hispanic-American,
5.6% as Asian-American, 2.8% as American-Indian, and 11.1% as other. Likewise,
participant educational attainment levels were as follows: 16.7% high school diploma or
equivalent (e.g., GED); 8.3% some college credit, no degree; 2.8%
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trade/technical/vocational training; 8.3% Associate degree; 50.0% Bachelor’s degree;
11.1% Master’s degree; 2.8% Doctorate degree.
Procedure
Experimental AIG measure data were collected on two occasions. Participant data
for the first administration was collected as part o f Study 1. A subset o f the participants
who completed Study 1 was invited to complete the measure for a second time.
Approximately one week following the first administration, participants were provided
with the link to the experimental AIG measure for a second time and asked to complete
the scale. For each administration, total scores were calculated using the same scoring
scheme described in Chapter 2. A total o f 47 participants completed the experimental
AIG measure twice. Due to suspected changes in the manner in which examinees
approached the second administration, examinees who obtained score differences greater
than 3 SEMs across administrations were removed from the test-retest sample. As a
result, 11 people were removed from the sample to arrive at the total sample (N = 36).
The mean number of days between administrations was 8.78 (SD = 2.38).
Results
The current analysis tests the temporal stability o f the experiential AIG measure
by assessing the reliability o f the measure over two testing sessions. As noted by McCrae,
Kurtz, Yamagata, and Terracciano (2011), test-retest reliability is conceptually
independent o f internal consistency, reflecting the consistency o f scores obtained on
separate occasions. Anastasi and Urbina (1997) state that test-retest reliability “shows the
extent to which scores on a test can be generalized over different occasions; the higher
the reliability, the less susceptible the scores are to random daily changes in the
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conditions o f the examinee or the testing environment” (p. 92). In general, test-retest
values of .70 or greater are considered acceptable (Andrews, Peter, & Teesson, 1994;
Burlingame, Lambert, Reisinger, Neff, & Mosier, 1995). The administration means,
standard deviations, and test-retest correlation are presented in Table 8. As shown, the
correlation between two experimental AIG measure administrations is acceptable.
Therefore, the results of this study support Hypothesis 3 and the temporal stability o f the
experimental AIG measure.

Table 8. Test-Retest Reliability fo r the Experimental AIG Measure
First Testing
Second Testing
Experimental AIG Measure
SD
M
SD
M
4.14
Total Score
9.50
9.89
4.96
Note. N = 36; *p < .001.

r
.80*

Discussion
Study 2 was designed to assess the relationship that the experimental AIG
measure shares with itself across test administrations. The results o f this analysis indicate
that the experimental AIG measure correlates well with itself (.80). Previous test-retest
research using AIG measures has obtained similar results (Freund & Holling, 2011).
However, to the researcher’s knowledge, this is the first test-retest study o f an on-the-fly
AIG measure. Rather, previous research used static items created using AIG
methodology, mimicking traditional test-retest methods. As such, these measures are
susceptible to the same practice effects seen in paper-and-pencil measures o f cognitive
ability. Given that each participant was administered assessments consisting o f different
items at an average interval of slightly over one week, the results obtained from the
current analysis are promising. Although a higher test-retest value is desirable, the items

of the experimental AIG measure may contain item features (e.g., radicals and
incidentals) that we have yet to identify or control. Likewise, modified scoring schemes
allowing for partial credit may improve the temporal consistency o f the scores obtained
from the measure. As such, supplemental research examining the manipulation o f the
basic item model and score calculations may produce more robust test-retest figures.
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CHAPTER 5: STUDY 3

SCALE VALIDATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Study 3 was designed to assess the relationship between the experimental AIG
measure and other measures o f G f To this end, the experimental AIG measure was
correlated with two established measures o f G f Likewise, the relationship between the
AIG measure and age, which is known to be related to Gf, was examined. Thus, the aim
o f Study 3 is to assess Hypotheses 3 concerning the criterion validity o f the experimental
AIG measure.
Participants
A subset of Study 1 examinees elected to participate in Study 3. The sample
consisted o f 31 respondents (12 male and 19 female) from the United States between the
ages o f 19 and 81 (M = 43.76; SD = 17.58). According to the central limit theorem,
samples o f greater than 30 participants will approximate a normal distribution (Field,
2009). As such, the size o f the sample in the current study is adequate. All participants
were recruited via snowball sampling through social media. O f the sample, 74.1%
identified as White/Caucasian, 6.5% as Hispanic-American, and 19.4 % as other.
Likewise, participant educational attainment levels were as follows: 9.7% some college
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credit, no degree; 3.2% trade/technical/vocational training; 38.7% Bachelor’s degree;
32.2% Master’s degree; 16.1% Doctorate degree.
Procedure
Study data were collected using three measures (described below). Participant
data on the experimental AIG measure were collected as part o f Study 1. A subset o f the
participants who completed Study 1 was invited to complete the criterion validation
measures. Following the completion o f the experimental AIG measure, participants were
provided with a unique identifying code and redirected to a survey containing the
criterion validation measures hosted on Qualtrics.com. Before beginning the criterion
validation measures, participants were instructed to enter a unique identifying code
allowing the scores obtained from the experimental AIG measure and validation
measures to be linked.
Measures
AIG Measure. The independent measure o f G f was assessed using the same
experimental AIG measure used in Study 1. The researcher invited a subset o f the Study
1 participants to participant in the current analysis after completing the 22 item
experimental AIG measure. Total scores were based on the scoring procedure described
in Chapter 2.
Letter Sets. Letter Sets (Set 1) (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976)
measures an examinee’s ability to identify patterns in groups o f letters and was used as a
measure G f Each item consists o f five four-letter strings (e.g., NLIK, PLIK, QLIK,
THIK, VLIK). The examinee’s task was to identify the rule shared by four o f the five
strings and eliminate the string that does not conform to the rule. Seven minutes were
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provided to complete the 15-item measure. Scores range from 0-15 with higher scores
indicating better performance. Previous research indicates that Letter Sets are relatively
culture-free measures, independent o f quantitative or verbal abilities, provide an efficient
measure o f G f and require only a minimal investment o f time (Duran, Powers, &
Swinton, 1987). Redick, Unsworth, Kelly, & Engle (2012) estimate the internal
consistency o f Letter Sets to be .78. Likewise, when subjected to confirmatory factor
analysis, the Letter Sets task loads substantially (.81) on the G f factor, indicating
appreciable fit to the construct (Hicks et al., 2015).
Number Series. Number Series (Thurstone & Thurstone, 1962) measures
mathematical-inductive reasoning, and is thought to be primarily influenced by G f (Kvist
& Gustafsson, 2008). Each item o f the measure consists o f a series o f numbers (e.g., 10,
11, 12, 13, 14). The examinee’s task is to identify the underlying mathematical
relationship shared between terms and extrapolate the next number in the sequence.
Examinees have 4.5 minutes to complete the 15-item measure. In a longitudinal study,
Schaie (2005) reports that the Number Series task displays a test-retest reliability o f r =
.77 and a seven-year test retest reliability r = .74. Likewise, Kvist and Gustafsson (2008)
report that the Number Series task loads substantially (.81) on the G f factor when
subjected to confirmatory factor analysis, suggesting a strong fit to the construct.
Results
In this analysis, the correlational relationships between the experimental AIG
measure and established measures o f G f are presented. Since this analysis assesses the
theoretical relationship between the experimental measure and criterion measures, it is
necessary to correct for a lack o f reliability in the criterion (Letter Sets and Number

103

Series), but not the independent measure (experimental AIG measure) (Ghiselli,
Campbell, & Zedeck, 1981; Guilford, 1954; Guion & Highouse, 2006; Schmitt &
Klimoski, 1991). Failure to correct for unreliability artificially weakens coefficient values
and masks the true relationship (Salgado, Moscoso, & Anderson, 2016). The means,
standard deviations, and corrected and uncorrected correlations for the experimental AIG
and criterion measures are presented in Table 9. As suggested by Hopkins (2002), the
following guidelines can be used to interpret the correlations: coefficients between .00
and .09 are very small or trivial; coefficients between .10 and .29 are small; coefficients
between .30 and .49 are moderate; coefficients between .50 and .69 are large; coefficients
between .70 and .89 are very large; and coefficients between .90 and 1.00 are nearly
perfect. Using Hopkins’s conventions, the correlations between the experimental AIG
measure and the criterion measures in Table 9 are classified as “large.” As such, the
results o f this analysis support Hypotheses 4a and 4b as indicated by a significant
relationship between the experimental AIG measure and criterion measures o f Letters
Sets and Number Series, respectively.

Table 9. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between the Experimental AIG
Measure and Criterion Measures
Measure
SD
1
M
2
3
4.48
1. Experimental AIG Measure 7.58
2. Letter Sets
9.61
3.35
.50 (.44*)
3. Number Series
7.71
2.87
.61 (.54**)
.90 (.70***) Note. n = 31; Corrected correlation coefficients are outside o f parentheses;
Uncorrected correlation coefficients inside o f parentheses; *p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p
<.001
—

—

Previous research has also noted that G f is related to demographic variables. For
instance, Cattell (1943) suggests that G f tends to decrease with age. Therefore, the scores
o f the experimental AIG measure should decrease as a function o f examinee age. Using
the participant data described in Study 1, the means, standard deviations, and corrected
and uncorrected correlations for the experimental AIG measure and age are presented in
Table 10. The result o f this analysis supports Hypothesis 4c as indicated by a significant
negative relationship between the experimental AIG measure and examinee age.

Table 10. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Between the Experimental AIG
Measure and Age____________________________________________________________
M
SD
1
Measure
2
5.12
1. Experimental AIG Measure
9.20
2. Age
36.30
—
12.67
-0.16**
Note. N = 333. *p < .05; **p < 01; ***p < .001

Discussion
Study 3 was designed to assess the relationship that the experimental AIG
measure shares with established measures o f Gf. After correcting for unreliability in the
criterion measures, the scores obtained from the experimental AIG measure and Letter
Sets (Ekstrom et al., 1976) produced a correlation o f .50. Likewise, using the same
correction, the scores of the experimental AIG measure and Number Series (Thurstone &
Thurstone, 1962) produced a correlation o f .61. Using Hopkins’s (2002) evaluative
guidelines, these correlations are described as “large.” As such, the results o f this study
indicate that the experimental AIG measure is tapping the construct o f G f as measured by
other established measures.
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The negative relationship between age and G f has been noted for some time. As
described by Cattell (1943), the nature o f G f is such that ability gains are seen through
adolescence and then diminishes with age. Past research examining the longitudinal
relationship between G f and perceptual speed support the generalized slowing o f
processing abilities as one ages (Schaie, 1989). Likewise, Bors and Forrin (1995) found
that the relationship between age and G f was reduced to a nonsignificant value after
controlling for mental speed, indicating that the decrement o f G f with age is substantially
related to processing speed. These findings are buttressed by findings linking G f and
shorter reaction times (Grabner, Fink, Stipacek, Neuper, & Neubauer, 2004). The
experimental AIG measure was designed as a brief measure o f G f forcing examinees to
respond quickly to items. As such, it is not surprising that in the current study, a
significant negative relationship was found between the experimental AIG measure and
age. This result provides limited support o f the assertion that the experimental measure is
tapping aspects o f G f
While the results obtained from the current study are promising, it should be
noted that the measures used in this study consisted o f relatively brief criterion measures
o f G f McGrew (2009) notes that G f is associated with myriad o f inductive and deductive
tasks. As such, future studies should be conducted on a diverse array o f G /instruments to
better understand the relationship that the experimental AIG measure has with G f
However, taken together, the results o f this study largely support the assertion that the
experimental AIG measure conforms to the G f construct, particularly as measured by
established criterion measures.
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CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION

In the psychological sciences, perhaps no construct has received as much attention
as cognitive ability. Although competing perspectives and theoretical orientations have
emerged regarding the nature o f intellectual functioning, there is overwhelming evidence
that generalized intelligence plays a key role. Across situations g demonstrates a
predictable influence on academic success (Ones et al., 2006), workplace performance
(Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), and problem solving in everyday situations (Gottfredson,
2002). Due to the substantial relationship shared with g, G f is regarded as the backbone
of intellect (Arendasy et al., 2008; Gustafsson, 1984, 1989,2001). Consisting o f the
ability to adapt to new situations and solve novel problems (Cattell, 1957,1971;
Gustafsson, 1984,1989, 2001; Schneider & McGrew, 2012), G f is best measured by non
verbal and culture-free tasks such as number series and analogical reasoning problems
(Sattler, 2001).
Despite a long psychometric tradition associated with the measurement o f
cognitive abilities, researchers have embraced technological advancements as a means to
uncover what it means to be smart. For instance, computer technology has provided test
developers with a dynamic platform to present an immense array o f unique test items
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types. Computers can display graphical figures and images o f greater complexity than
could be conveyed through paper-and-pencil administration. Coupled with internet
technology, assessments can be delivered to all comers o f the globe in a cost effective
and convenient manner. However, such unproctored administrations raise the issue o f test
security, such as cheating and item sharing (Cook & Eignor, 1991), limiting the
acceptance o f the results produced (Naglieri et al., 2004).
Historically, test developers have used multiple test forms or CAT administrations
to combat test security issues. While these methods are able to curtail some o f the threats
to test security as compared to fixed measures (Guo, Tay, & Drasgow, 2009), these
methods also require large pools o f continuously updated, psychometrically sound items.
However, it has become clear that costly and inefficient methods o f traditional item
construction by human item writers cannot keep pace with the growing demand.
Likewise, the items created by such means often lack the psychometric rigor needed to
seed item pools. As such, researchers have begun to explore advanced methods to
generate high-quality test items.
Rooted in cognitive and computer sciences, AIG methodology allows researchers
to specify the structural elements that define item difficulty to produce large pools o f
items with known psychometric characteristics (Geerlings et al., 2011). The rapidly
advancing field o f AIG methodology has gained a considerable amount o f attention from
the psychometrics community for its ability to quickly, efficiently, and cost effectively
produce vast pools o f items based solely on an item model and a computer algorithm
(Gierl et al., 2015). In doing so, the AIG framework solves many o f the practical issues
and threats to test security that have hindered test construction and administration.
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In the present study, a unique item type designed to measure G f was developed
using AIG methodology, allowing for items to be generated on-the-fly at the moment o f
item presentation. The item type was specifically designed such that the structural
elements o f the item model could be manipulated by a computer algorithm to guide item
construction. Using the automatic min-max approach (Arendasy & Sommer, 2010,2012)
as a guiding force, the latent trait, item format, cognitive model, and radicals and formal
constraints were specified and deduced by the researcher. Thus, the current research
builds upon previous research by creating a unique measure o f G f that combines two
highly ^-saturated measures: number series and analogical reasoning tasks. The benefit of
using such methodology is that construct relatedness o f the measure is built directly into
the items generated through the systematic manipulation o f the item characteristics
thought to relate to item difficulty. Likewise, the elements that could potentially interfere
with the cognitive processes involved with solving the items were constrained or omitted.
Consequently, the approach taken in the current study allows for the generation o f
potentially thousands o f unique items generated on-the-fly at the moment o f presentation,
without the need for human review before their administration. The result o f this process
was a brief 22-item experimental AIG measure o f G f combining two highly g-saturated
tasks.
The current research was designed to investigate the efficacy o f the experimental
AIG measure in a sample o f adults residing in the United States. In a series o f studies, the
construct representation, temporal stability, and criterion-relatedness o f the experimental
AIG measure were examined.
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Study 1
In Study 1, along with conventional psychometric analyses, the unidimensionality
and construct representation o f the experimental AIG measure were assessed.
Conventional psychometric statistics indicate that the experimental AIG measure is
internally consistent with acceptable discrimination and difficulty values. Likewise, the
results of the Martin-Lof and Andersen likelihood ratio tests indicate that the
experimental measure data conform well to the Rasch model, supporting its
unidimensionality. Using an LLTM analysis (Fischer, 1973; Van den Noortgate, de
Boeck, & Meulders, 2003) to test the efficacy o f four hypothesized radicals (Consistent
Mathematical Operations, Mixed Mathematical Operations, Duplicate Numbers, Flipped
Relationships), the results indicated that each significantly contributed to scale difficulty.
Therefore, the results o f this analysis can be seen as a validation o f the use o f the
hypothesized radicals, thus supporting the construct representation o f the experimental
AIG measure (Embretson, 1983). Likewise, the results o f the LLTM analysis support the
inclusion of the radicals not only in the current cognitive model, but also in the
generation o f future AIG items as they are now calibrated. Furthermore, the hypothesized
cognitive model accounted for a substantial portion o f the empirically derived difficulty
parameter produced by the Rasch model. As such, the proposed model displays adequate
content coverage as accounted for by the item radicals. Flowever, an examination o f the
plot o f empirically and LLTM derived difficulty parameters does indicate that the
experimental AIG measure tests a limited range o f theta with items confined to the range
o f +2 to -2. As such, the inclusion o f a more diverse set o f item radicals into the
construction o f the items may tap a wider breadth o f intellectual functioning. While the

110

elements that may improve the content coverage o f G f using the present item type are
addressed in the Limitations and Future Directions section, the results obtained in Study 1
provide initial evidence for the construct representation of the items generated by the
experimental AIG measure.
Study 2
In Study 2 the temporal stability o f the experimental AIG measure was assessed
by administering the measure on two different occasions approximately one week apart.
The results o f this analysis indicate that the scores produced by the experimental AIG
measure are consistent across testing situations. Specifically, the experimental AIG
measure that was administered to participants on two different occasions consisted o f a
diverse set o f items that had varying surface features and resulted in scores that were
consistent.
Study 3
In Study 3, the criterion relationships shared between the experimental AIG
measure and other established measures o f G f were examined. The results o f the study
indicate that large correlations coefficients were observed between the experimental
measure and criterion measures. Likewise, using the total sample o f participants, a
negative relationship was seen between the experimental AIG measure and age, a
phenomenon that has been noted in other investigations o f the nature o f G f (Cattell,
1943). Taken together, the scores obtained from the experimental AIG measure conform
to the scores obtained from other criterion measures o f G f indicating that the scale is
tapping aspects o f the construct o f interest.

Ill

Limitations and Future Directions
As in all empirical studies, certain inherent limitations are evident that should be
addressed, but also pave the way for future research. Given the many choices that were
made in the creation o f the experimental AIG measures using an innovative item type,
several aspects o f item development can be clarified through additional studies to
improve the measurement precision o f the instrument. For instance, in the current
experimental AIG measure, constraints were placed on the size o f the randomly
generated number used to seed the base number in each term, disallowing numbers to
obtain values below zero. Likewise, the same constraint disallowed the numbers that
comprised the terms to obtain values greater than 30. Similarly, constraints were placed
on the change number that was used to advance each number o f the sequence to values o f
1 to 4. Future research could relinquish such constraints and then compare the restricted
and unrestricted models. As such, additional research is required to assess the need for
and effectiveness o f limiting seed and change values to such a limited range.
Likewise, while the LLTM analysis described in Study 1 demonstrated that the
proposed cognitive model showed substantial content coverage, a more diverse array of
potential radical elements is possible. For instance, the current version o f the
experimental AIG measure limited the size o f each analogical reasoning term to three
numbers (e.g., 3 - 5 - 7 ) . While this choice was made in the development phase to limit
the cognitive complexity o f the items generated, as noted by Primi (2001), increasing the
number o f elements to which examinees must attend in G f tasks is expected to influence
item complexity. Therefore, future research on the experimental AIG measure may
choose to include number series terms with length as few as two numbers, or increase
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series length to include four or more numbers. Such changes to the scale may result in a
more diverse array o f psychometric item attributes, exhibiting a greater range o f
difficulties.
Additionally, the number o f answer choices in the current version o f the
experimental AIG measure was limited to three. Similar to the length o f the number
series in each term, varying the number o f answer choice from which the participant must
choose could lower or raise the cognitive complexity o f the items generated as the
number o f elements from which the examinee must attend changes. Taken together, these
two modifications to the experimental AIG measure could serve as radicals in future
research, allowing for the production o f an extensive array o f items exhibiting diverse
psychometric properties while still conforming to the G f construct.
The experimental AIG measure also employed a relatively simplistic dichotomous
scoring protocol in order to utilize the LLTM analysis. However, future iterations o f the
experimental AIG measure, or similar measures, could utilize a partial-credit scoring
model, allowing for a more diverse range o f scores. That is, a more complex scoring
algorithm may be applied to the data, allowing item scores to take on a range o f values
depending on how quickly a correct answer is obtained. As such, participants could be
awarded partial credit for answers, better allowing their score to reflect both their speed
and accuracy. Hypothetically, a modified scoring scheme such as this may improve the
internal consistency, temporal stability, and criterion relatedness o f the experimental AIG
measure. Simply stated, a modified scoring algorithm may improve the measurement
precision o f G f

Importantly, although previous research has shown the value of the data collected
from mTurk samples (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Casler et ah, 2013), and such crowd
sourcing methods provide psychological researchers an expedient means to obtain
variance on a range o f psychological attributes (Chandler et ah, 2014; Krupnikov &
Levine, 2014), their use should be further scrutinized. Logically, the compensation of
participants from such sources is tied to how quickly they are able to complete as many
of the competing tasks (e.g. the current experimental AIG measure) as are available at the
time. Moreover, given the rising costs associated with acquiring participants from such
sources (e.g., Bensinger, 2015), the data obtained from these participant pools deserves
additional critical analysis as well as potential screening methods to identify high-quality
workers.
Likewise, in addition to both video and written instructions detailing the tasks
involved in answering the experimental AIG measure, participants were provided an
opportunity to practice an unlimited number o f items before beginning the actual
measure. In addition to becoming familiar with the tasks involved in answering a given
item type, practice may allow for a more accurate assessment o f an individual’s true
performance on a given task. As such, given that research has consistently found racial
gaps in the scores obtained on cognitive measures (e.g., Roth et al., 2001), limiting their
use in organizational settings, the availability o f practice items may serve to lessen such
gaps. Likewise, such practice items may also serve to reduce examinee apprehension
regarding the testing situation and bolster perceptions o f fairness. Future research may
gauge the impact o f practice on G f scores and examinee perceptions, potentially allowing
for broader use in selection contexts.
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However, given the results, and pending replication, it is possible that an on-thefly CAT measure can be developed based on the calibrated item radicals o f the
experimental AIG measure. Using combinations o f item radicals, the length o f the
experimental measure may be greatly reduced, providing a more expedient estimation of
Gf. Thus, the creation o f such an adaptive measure would serve to reduce examinee
fatigue while addressing some o f the test security threats associated with assessments
derived from conventional methods. Likewise, AIG methodology as seen in the current
on-the-fly measure also provides stable and effective alternate test forms for use in
repeated measures studies and evaluations. As such, researchers and practitioners alike
may use these types o f scales to evaluate the impact o f a variety o f psychological
interventions. In addition to the test construction and test security issues associated with
traditional item construction, researchers may also use these types o f measures to assess
performance without concerns o f item memorization.
Conclusion
The field o f cognitive abilities research can be seen as an evolving science. From
the early days o f Galtonian measures to the advances brought by computerized
technology, the field o f psychometrics has embraced methodological and technical
advances. The advent o f AIG methodology serves as the next step in attempting to
provide a more complete coverage o f the construct space. The current collection o f
studies introduces an experimental AIG measure as a means to overcome the limitations
associated with conventional item creation methods and threats to test security. In sum,
the results o f these studies highlight the benefits o f using AIG methodology to quickly,
economically, and effectively generate high-quality on-the-fly G f test items. The
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experimental AIG measure fulfills the goal o f delivering a measure o f cognitive ability
that is well suited for large-scale cognitive ability assessment via online administration.
Thus, as additional research is conducted in the development and calibration o f such
instruments, researchers and organizations alike may realize the benefit o f using AIG
methodology to produce effective measures.
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